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Introduction: What Kind of Justice?
Some wrongs fundamentally challenge our capacity to both understand and judge. This is certainly true of the most extreme and radical
t I am grateful for research support from the Swiss National Science Foundation
and the Global Visitors Program at the New York University School of Law. Particular
thanks goes to Daniel Thuirer and Marie Theres F6gen, University of Zurich, for their
constant support of my work on this subject. Much of the research for this article was
undertaken in 2006 when I was a Research Fellow at the Centre for Human Rights and
Global Justice, The New York University School of Law, and at the Grotius Centre for
International Legal Studies in The Hague. I would like to thank the members of both
Centers for their assistance and ideas, in particular Philip Alston, Jayne Huckerby, Kelly
Ryan, and Christine Tremblay. I have had the opportunity to present an earlier draft of
this article at the Spring 2006 Global Fellows Forum, The New York University School of
Law, and at the 2007 Marie Curie Top Summer School, Grotius Center for International
Legal Studies. For their thoughtful responses, I would like to thank the participants and
commentators, in particular Thomas Nagel, Paul Van Zyl, and Roelof Haveman. Finally,
I am especially grateful to David Bradley, Regula Ludi, Jean d'Aspremont, and Karsten
Behn for their continuing interest, encouragement and input.
41 CORNELL INTL LJ. 675 (2008)

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 41

forms of evil witnessed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries-mass
killings, systematic rapes, tortures, and so much more than anybody
should be expected to witness. In the face of atrocities so outrageous in
nature and scope, no response can ever be adequate. "All we know," writes
Hannah Arendt, "is that we can neither punish nor forgive such offenses
and that they therefore transcend the realm of human affairs and the potentialities of human power, both of which they radically destroy wherever
they make their appearance."' Yet, some nations are seeking to come to
terms with and to move beyond an immediate past saturated with unspeakable cruelty. 2 With the violence ended, these societies are facing the daunting task of restoring decency and trust in a human landscape disfigured by
degradation and loss. 3 In an effort to replace violence with dialogue and
terror with respect, these societies must struggle over how to rebuild a
social fabric after neighbors have turned against neighbors, friends against
4
friends, communities against communities.
At any such time of massive transformation, one question takes on
renewed urgency: how should societies deal with their evil pasts? In
addressing this crucial and highly topical issue, the contemporary debate
has focused on "transitional justice"-a term increasingly employed to
describe the process by which societies confront legacies of widespread or
systematic human rights abuses as they move from repression or civil war
to a more just, democratic, or peaceful order. 5 Transitional justice, in the
broad sense of the term, refers to some forms of justice on which countries
undergoing intense political change may rely. 6 It is justice informed by
prior injustice and infused with transformative dimensions-justice caught
between the past and the future, between backward-looking and forward1.
MINOw,

HANNAH

ARENDT, THE HUMA

BETWEEN VENGEANCE

,

CONDITION

AND FORGIVENESS:

241 (2d ed. 1998); see also

MARTHA

FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND

MASS VIOLENCE 5 (1998) (emphasizing "the incompleteness and inescapable inadequacy
of each possible response to collective atrocities").
2. Harvey M. Weinstein & Eric Stover, Introduction: Conflict, Justice and Reclamation, in My NEIGHBOR, My ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS
ATROCITY 1, 1 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004).
3. See id. at 1-2.
4. See id.
5. Transitional justice as a field of academic and policy interest has grown tremendously over the last fifteen years or so. Classic conceptualizations include, to name just a
few, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES
(NeilJ. Kritz ed., 1995); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES
(A. James McAdams ed., 1997). See also DILEMMAS OF RECONCILIATION: CASES AND CONCEPTS (Carol A.L. Prager & Trudy Govier eds., 2003); JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS:
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2004); RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOW OF WAR (2002); MINOW, supra note 1; STEVEN R.
RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (2d ed. 2001); Ru-l G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE (2000); TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I.
Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000).
6. See TEITEL, supra note 5, at 223 (noting various "legal measures pursued in periods of political transition" and maintaining that they "are emblematic of normative
change").
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looking.
With this definition, however, it is still not clear what justice in transition might mean, or what the hope for justice should lead us to want in
periods of radical political change. The concept of justice, after all, can be
used in evaluating many different things and its aspirations are rendered
more difficult in the contexts of unstable governance, security, and economic institutions. What should be deemed just and fair as a state undergoes a major political transformation?
Typically, debates on these issues are framed in terms of an opposition: retributive justice versus restorative justice. The opposition looks like
a stalemate, as each approach seems to exclude the other. Retributive justice, on the one hand, is commonly linked to the belief that punishmentthe deliberate imposition of suffering and harm-is justified insofar as it
fits the wrongness of an act and the agent's responsibility for the act. 8
Restorative justice, on the other hand, calls for repair instead of punishment and for healing rather than inflicting further retributive suffering. 9
Restorative justice is often praised as an interpersonal, community-oriented
way to resolve conflicts, seeking to restore the dignity of both victim and
offender by reintegrating them into respectful and healthy communities. 10
Such a paradigm of restorative justice, which comports closely with a
notion of reconciliation and social harmony, has prominently featured in
the work of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)the prime example of a commission with the power to grant amnesty to
perpetrators on the condition that they fully disclose the fate of those who
they killed or abducted." Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the 1994 recipient
of the Nobel Peace Price, explains the TRC's commitment to restorative
justice in these terms:
We contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which
was characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment. In the spirit of ubuntu, the central
concern is the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim and the
perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated
into the
12
community he [or she] has injured by his [or her] offense.
7. See id. at 223-25.
8. See, e.g., MANI, supra note 5, at 33-36; Juan E. MWndez, In Defense of Transitional
justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES, supra note 5,

at 1, 6.
9. See generally RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Burt Galaway &

Joe Hudson eds., 1996); George Pavlich, Towards an Ethics of Restorative justice, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW 1 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002); Lode Walgrave, Imposing
Restoration Instead of Inflicting Pain: Reflections on the judicial Reaction to Crime, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 61 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003).
10. Cf. Walgrave, supra note 9, at 67 ("The priority given to restoration focuses on

social life rather than an abstract moral or legal system of any kind.").
11. See Robert 1. Rotberg, Truth Commissions and the Provision of Truth, Justice, and
Reconciliation, in TRUTH V.JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 5, at

1,6.
12.

DESMOND MPILO TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 54-55 (1999).
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Interestingly, Tutu traces the notion of restorative justice to the "African value" of ubuntu, literally "I am human because I belong."'13 Ubuntu, a
term from the Nguni group of languages, refers to a specific Weltanschauung, or world-view, based on the ideals of harmony, friendliness, and community. 14 The implication seems to be that there is a different kind of
justice, distinct from retribution or punishment, which requires a commitment to repair broken relationships, to heal the wounds of victims and
offenders alike, and to restore the health and well-being of their communities. For Tutu, this alternative vision of justice provides a moral foundation
for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the kind adopted by South
Africa. 15
Whatever one might think of the conceptual coherence of Tutu's
model of restorative justice, rooted as it is in such lofty ideals as forgiveness
and social harmony, the idea of an alternative vision of justice with a more
human face is intriguing. Crime, after all, is not primarily an offense
against some abstract notion of the "state," or against some impersonal set
of rules, it is the wrongful violation of a person by another person. Our
concern, then, should not be so much with making the offender suffer as
with restoring human relations and affirming the victim's status as a moral
being of equal worth.
Building on this basic intuition, this article undertakes to further consider the idea of a "different kind of justice," one that is less vindictive and
state-centered and is more caring and responsive to human suffering. In
doing so, it relies on the concept of justice as recognition-the kind of justice that is involved in giving due recognition to the pain and humiliation
experienced by victims of collective violence. Recognition here is essentially individual-centered. Unlike restorative approaches to justice, which
emphasize the restoration of communal bonds, recognition focuses primarily on the individual's sense of injustice and threatened self-respect, drawing a clear line between such matters of justice and other moral concerns
(including democracy, peace, or reconciliation). This focus may enable us
to gain a deeper understanding of the moral dilemmas and needs arising in
the aftermath of genocide or barbarous civil wars. Rather than confining
the debate on transitional justice to the simplistic either/or choice of "retribution versus restoration," this approach makes room for a broader, more
critical, and sensitive outlook by asking how injustice looks to the victims.
This article draws from some recent works that represent a turn in
political and legal philosophy from an exclusive concern with just distribution of social goods to accounts of "negative morality."' 16 In other words,
these works expound a view that sees the primary task of moral and politi13. See id. at 31.
14. See id.
15. See id; see also 1 TRUTH

& RECONCILIATION

COMM'N,

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

ch. 5, 55(a) (1998) ("ITIhe tendency to equate
justice with retribution must be challenged and the concept of restorative justice considered as an alternative."), available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/.
16. See generally Jonathan Allen, The Place of Negative Morality in PoliticalTheory, 29
POL. THEORY 337 (2001).
COMMISSION OF

SouTH

AFRICA REPORT
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cal theory as negative-as an effort "to shape and constrain normative
reflection and the construction of social ideals through an analysis of evils,
injuries, and experiences of vulnerability." 17 Closely allied to this
approach is an explicit attempt to identify and respond to the distinctive
perspective that victims of social evils have on society. Taking into account
the point of view of those who are on the receiving end of such evils does
not mean accepting their point of view at face value; it does mean, however,
that as a matter of moral and political urgency one should examine the
victims' claims and ask whether they have reasons for feeling the way they
do.' 8 As Judith Shklar writes, with respect to the sense of injustice: "No
theory of either justice or injustice can be complete if it does not take
account of the subjective sense of injustice and the sentiments that make us
cry out for revenge." 19
With this general idea in mind, this article proposes to construe transitional justice as a moral project of recognition that puts victims' negative
experiences of domination, cruelty, suffering, and so forth at its center.
Recognition, as understood here, is a matter of appropriately responding to
and acting in light of what we know or perceive of victims of past wrongs.
It involves extending to victims the concern and respect due to them in
virtue of what they have suffered and of what they are-wounded others in
our society. If, as commonly thought, justice is a matter of giving what is
due, then this kind of recognition can quite easily be understood as an
elaboration of that maxim, for it responds to the injustice of being denied
the rights, the consideration, and the concern that it is appropriate for a
person to enjoy.
Recognition, so understood, manifests itself at different levels. Certainly it requires the just redistribution of resources and rights. This, however, is not the whole story. This article suggests that transitional politics
of recognition must reach beyond distributive systems of goods in the society to investigate the full dimension of injustice and the sense of victimization it arouses. The salient point is that we cannot measure the harm of
social and political evils simply by considering the tangible deprivation of
social goods (liberty, opportunity, income, etc.). Evildoing, such as torture
or rape, does not only cause the victim physical suffering, but it betokens a
profound lack of concern-a kind of symbolic devaluation that is not reducible to the absence of goods. 20 From this perspective, "it is not only unjust
to deprive people of their social rights but it is also unjust to make them
feel the fury and resentment of being humiliated."2 1 This article interprets
this symbolic dimension to be a core concern of recognition.
Six additional points need to be made. First, as already alluded to, the
proposed model of recognition is consistent with a commitment to individ17. Id. at 341.
18. See generally JUDITH N.
FACES OF INJUSTICE].

19. Id. at 49.
20. See id.
21. Id.

SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE

(1990) [hereinafter

THE
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ualism. Here, the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or individuals, rather than political, cultural, or religious communities.
Second, the status of "ultimate unit of concern" specifically attaches
to individual victims of collective evils. Assuming a perspective that values
individuals and the reality of their individual experiences of suffering and
harm, this article endorses a rather broad notion of victimhood comprising
three groups: those who suffer direct injury or violence (primary victims),
those family members and friends who grieve the injuries or loss of a loved
one (secondary victims), and individual members of a specific community
affected by structural violence and systemic injustice (tertiary victims).

22

Third, in analyzing the dynamics of large-scale evil, we may distinguish between two levels at which the proposed concept of recognition
operates. While the first level focuses on individuals and their personal
responsibility (interpersonal recognition), 23 the second level concerns the
distinctively collective nature of "macro" instances of evil (collective recognition). 24 Far from being at odds with one another, these two levels are
complementary, or so this article shall argue.
Fourth, in building the discourse of recognition around a dual framework of the kind just mentioned, this article suggests that extraordinary
evil-such as genocide and ethnic cleansing-is individual and collective at
once. Although extraordinary evil is composed of individual acts and
responsibilities, it goes beyond "ordinary crimes" (assault, murder, rape,
and so on) by virtue of its inherently societal, macro-level, and systemic
dimension.

25

22. This view of victimhood is fairly standard in the transitional justice literature.
See, e.g., TRUDY GOVIER, TAKING WRONGS SERIOUSLY: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, RECONCILIATION,
AND THE POLITICS OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE 30 (2006). Furthermore, the suggested notion of
victimhood is largely consistent with the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of justice
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power which defines victims of crimes as "persons
who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental
injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights." G.A. Res. 40/34, 9[ 1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/34/Annex (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter Declaration of Basic Principles ofJustice]. This Declaration further specifies that
the term "victim" may also include "immediate family or dependants of the direct victim
and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to
prevent victimization." Id. ' 2.
23. Because of its "individualizing" perspective, this mode of recognition applies
essentially to the categories of primary and secondary victims. Structural or systemic
injustice and its tertiary victims are, by contrast, primary objects of what I call "collective recognition."
24. To dispel any misunderstanding, it is important to note here that these two
modes of recognition, "interpersonal recognition" and "collective recognition," are both
collective in the sense that they involve obligations of political institutions such as the
state or the government. The distinction here is not so much one of "individual versus
political morality," but one of "individual versus collective responsibility." Although
interpersonal recognition is expressive of, and rooted in, a fundamentally individualizing view of wrongdoers and their deeds, collective (or group-based) recognition focuses
on the inherently collective- "de-individuated" -nature of widespread evil. I have been
unable to design a more suitable terminology.
25. For a critical account of the relation between "extraordinary evil" and "ordinary
crime," see Miriam J.Aukerman, ExtraordinaryEvil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
UnderstandingTransitionalJustice, 15 HARv.HuM. RTS.J. 39 (2002). The discussion here
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Fifth, in theorizing recognition, this article assumes an understanding
of law and politics that is secular and performative rather than religious
and sentiment-based. Consequently, the success of the project of recognition does not depend on emotional or internal states such as repentance or
remorse, but rather on compliance with externals or formalistic rituals.
Sixth, and finally, this article is not concerned with the concept of law
in periods of dramatic change. 26 Rather, this article strives to offer a moral
argument about justice and recognition that may serve as a vehicle for critical reflection on the law's use in the normative construction of new political regimes.
The main argument of this article is simple to state: one misses an
important part of the story in the context of collective and systematic
wrongs if one fails to see the significance of moral recognition for the victims of those wrongs. Part I of this article opens the discussion by calling
attention to two recent philosophical works that make the negative experiences of marginalized and victimized groups their central concern: Axel
Honneth's The Struggle for Recognition and Avishai Margalit's The Decent
Society. These works, this article argues, offer a mode of thinking about
recognition that is both "realistic" and sensitive to the experience of human
suffering, and thus may serve as a good starting point for further critical
investigation.
Part II elaborates a phenomenology of recognition in general terms as
an additional step towards understanding what recognition might mean
and why it might be important for the victims of terrible human rights
abuses. Part 11 also suggests that we think of recognition quite generally in
terms of what Thomas Nagel, in his now classic article War and Massacre,
referred to as "the maintenance of a direct interpersonal response to the
people one deals with."'27 The claim is that this formulation grounds an
interpersonal account of recognition that belongs in the lexicon of societal
responses to mass violence. Central, here, is the idea (common to restorative justice models) that criminal behavior is first and foremost a conflict
between individuals rather than a violation of the state.
Part III provides an entrance into a political concept of recognition that
accommodates this view of crime as a primarily interpersonal matter.
Moving from the private into the public realm, this article proposes a
model of triadic interaction (somehow akin to the process of a trial or a
truth commission) in which the state, as a third party, plays a crucial role
in granting public recognition to those who have been wronged.
Part IV extends the argument by considering the distinctive nature of
collective evil and its impact on individual victims. As this article argues at
cannot elaborate a theoretical framework suited to a deeper understanding of the distinctive nature and practices of collective evildoing. For a detailed and penetrating treat-

ment of this matter, see

ARNEJOHAN VETLESEN, EVIL AND HUMAN AGENCY: UNDERSTANDING

(2005).
26. 1 have touched upon this question elsewhere. See Frank Haldemann, Gustav
Radbruch vs. Hans Kelsen: A Debate on Nazi Law, 18 RATIO JuRis. 162 (2005).
27. Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 136 (1972).
COLLECTIVE EVILDOING

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 41

length, the inherently collective nature of the crimes under consideration
demands some kind of collective or group-based recognition intended to
serve as a complement to interpersonal accounts. Finally, the article concludes by identifying some moral values or concerns other than recognition that may inform the pursuit of transitional justice. Here, the
underlying assumption is that we should think of transitional justice in
terms of moral conflicts and attempts to achieve acceptable compromises.
I.

Humiliation, Decency, and Recognition

For the most part, moral philosophers and political theorists have
tended to focus on positive ethical concepts such as "good," "right," "duty,"
"virtue," "excellence," "freedom," and "justice."'2 8 There is usually little
interest in exploring the significance of "negative" moral concepts and
experiences-injury, domination, cruelty, suffering, humiliation, violence,
vices, and so forth. 2 9 A common assumption is that one may regard these
negative emotions simply as the absence of the positive, as an abnormality
that independent positive principles are designed to control or eliminate.
In recent times, however, thinkers who can properly be described as
philosophers of negative morality have questioned this conventional
account.30 Most prominent, here, is the later work of Judith Shklar.
According to Shklar, the most persuasive justification of liberalism begins
with a fundamental evil in human experience, a summum malum, which all
of us fear and would avoid if we could-cruelty. 3 1 What characterizes this
outlook, termed by Shklar as "[tihe liberalism of fear," is that it sees the
main concern of (liberal) politics as negative, as a commitment to the eradication or minimization of cruelty. 32 Shklar's strategy consists, not in
championing positive ideals such as equality or justice, but rather in "putting cruelty first."'33 Negative morality, then, becomes the touchstone of
political philosophy. In this view, the primary goal of politics is to give a
voice to the victimized and marginalized, to see and respond to their experiences of suffering and cruelty, and to curb vices and combat evils.
There may be good reasons for placing phenomena and concepts of
injury, cruelty, injustice, and suffering at the start of a moral and political
philosophy. The picture of political life seems incomplete without a closer
analysis of practices conducive to disrespect, degradation, humiliation and
so on. By paying attention to these types of human threats, we might gain
a better understanding of positive values and dispositions such as virtue,
respect, honor, loyalty, or justice. Nevertheless, the central moral reason to
analyze these practices is that there is a fundamental difference between
promoting good and eliminating evil. The moral reason for that is simple:
28. Allen, supra note 16, at 339.
29. See id.
30. For an important reflection on negative morality see id. at 337-40.
31. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, POLITICAL THOUGHT & POLITIcAL THINKERS 10-11 (Stanley
Hoffmann ed., 1998).
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id. at 11.
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"It is much more urgent to remove painful evils than to create enjoyable
benefits."' 34 This is easily seen with regard to societies seeking recovery
from political evil. When it comes to such societies, the priority is to put
an end to, and mark a break with, the legacy of the past.
In what follows, this article calls attention to two works, each of which
(this article suggests) provides us with a persuasive account of how social
ideals can be constructed from negative experiences of vulnerability-Axel
Honneth's The Struggle for Recognition and Avishai Margalit's The Decent
Society. Both works represent a "realistic," non-utopian political outlook
capable of seeing and responding to the sense of disrespect, suffering, and
cruelty that victims of atrocity and repression experience. These two
books, although not addressing the topic of transitional justice directly,
suggest ways of gaining a better moral understanding of how people's
sense of humiliation and need for recognition matter in times of radical
political change. 3 5 This is not to say that these works can provide ultimate
answers or solutions to the complex social phenomena in question.
Rather, these works sketch out a helpful framework for further exploration
and critical discussion.
A.

Honneth's Struggle for Recognition

In his work The Struggle for Recognition, first published in German in
1992, Honneth provides an account of social conflicts that emphasizes the
human need for relations of mutual recognition (Anerkennung) as a precon36
dition for achieving a distinctively human sense of self-realization.
Rather than situating his project within the framework of a "HobbesianMachiavellian" conception of society as an egoistic struggle for self-preservation, Honneth is inspired by Hegel and Georg Herbert Mead to stress the
importance of social interaction to the development and maintenance of a
34. AVISHAI
35.

MARGALIT,

THE DECENT SOCIETY 4 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996).

See generally AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL GRAM-

MAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS (Joel Anderson trans., Polity Press 1995) (1992); MARGALIT,
supra note 34.

36. See generally HONNETH, supra note 35. For an excellent discussion of Honneth's
account see id. at x-xxi (translator Joel Anderson outlines Honneth's philosophy). See
also PAUL RICOEUR,

THE COURSE OF RECOGNITION 186-246

(David Pellauer trans.,

Harvard Univ. Press 2005) (2004); Jonathan Allen, Decency and the Strugglefor Recognition, 24 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 449 (1998). Nancy Fraser has questioned the validity of
Honneth's account, contending that it is not a super-category called "recognition," but
the "norm of participatory parity" that should be the guiding notion of a critical theory
of society. Nancy Fraser, Recognition Without Ethics? 18 THEORY, CULTURE & Soc'Y 21,
27 (2001). This deontological norm refers to the material and cultural conditions necessary for all members of society to participate on a par with others in social life; it
requires sufficient material goods ("redistribution") and "institutionalized patterns of
cultural value" ("recognition") as two mutually irreducible dimensions of social participation. Id. Although I have much sympathy with Fraser's notion of social parity, which
alerts us to how to social justice is entwined with both economic and cultural conditions, Fraser's conception lacks an adequate account of moral or criminal injury-adequate to the task of coming to terms with victims of mass atrocities and their
experiences of extreme humiliation and disrespect. Unfortunately, there is not an
opportunity here to pursue this argument.
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person's sense of self-trust and self-worth. 3 7 Drawing on Mead's social
psychology and his notion of the "I,"Honneth argues that it is only intersubjectively-through experiencing recognition from others-that we can
have any sense of self at all. 38 For Honneth, one's need to relate to oneself
as a responsible, socially-valued agent depends crucially on the presence of
self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem. 39 Each of these affectively
laden self-conceptions-or, to use Hegelian language, "practical relationsto-self' (praktische Selbstbeziehungen)-involves the experience of being
granted recognition from others. 40 Honneth, in a recent paper, neatly summarizes this point when he writes:
To this extent every human subject is dependent, in an elementary way, on a
context of social forms of interaction that are regulated by normative principles of mutual recognition; and the absence of such recognition relations
will be followed by experience of disrespect or humiliation that cannot be
without damaging
consequences for the single individual's identity
41
formation.
As this passage makes clear, a distinctive element of Honneth's
approach is the importance it attributes to the investigation of negative
experiences such as disrespect or humiliation. 42 Central to Honneth's
"social theory with normative content" is his interpretation of social struggles as motivated by the experience of being denied the conditions neces43
sary for identity-formation (which Honneth refers to as "disrespect").
The "grammar" of such struggles is "moral" inasmuch as they are driven by
the normative ideal of a society in which patterns of recognition would
allow individuals to develop and maintain a human sense of self.44 As Paul
Ricoeur notes, however, "negative sentiments give flesh and blood to the
struggle for recognition. '45 The sense of indignation and outrage that the
rejection of (morally-motivated) claims to recognition generates provides a
"moral" basis for social resistance and revolt. 46 In this way, Honneth
argues that negative experiences of disrespect can, but do not inevitably
have to, "become the motivational impetus for [the] struggle for
recognition."

47

For Honneth, however, there is another reason-apart from the idea of
an emancipatory potential in social life-why paying attention to negative
experiences and concepts is important.4 8 He suggests that it is valuable to
37. See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 11-91.
38. See id. at 71-91.
39. See id. at 76.
40. See id; Axel Honneth, Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice,
47 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 351, 354 (2004) [hereinafter Recognition and Justice].
41. Recognition and Justice, supra note 40, at 354.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 352-54.
44. Id. at 356.
45. RICOEUR, supra note 36, at 188.
46. HONNETH, supra note 35, at 138; RiCOEUR, supra note 36, at 187-88.
47. HONNETH, supra note 35, at 138.
48. See id. at 143-79.
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investigate phenomena of disrespect and injury because this demonstrates
the moral significance of various forms of social interaction relevant to the
issue of recognition. 4 9 To sum up very roughly, Honneth argues that moral
injury, unlike misfortune, always involves an experience of denial of recognition.5 0 A physical injury, for instance, becomes a moral injury only if it
is accompanied by forms of disrespect or humiliation that deny recognition. Moral attitudes, then, are inherently connected with positive ideals of
recognition.5 1 Therefore, one can conclude that there are as many forms of
52
recognition as there are corresponding forms of moral injury.
From here, Honneth sets out to identify three levels or stages of relation-to-self relevant to the issue of recognition. The first, and most elemen53
tary, is self-confidence, or literally "trust in oneself' (Selbstvertrauen).
This mode of practically relating to oneself is, according to Honneth's theory of recognition, vital for becoming a fully autonomous and individuated
person.5 4 Drawing on the object-relation theory, particularly as elaborated
by the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott, Honneth argues that the formation and maintenance of self-trust are dependent on intimate relationships-child-parent relationships as well as adult relationships of love and
friendship-in which human beings acquire the capacity to express their
needs as their own without fear.55 This sense of self-trust, facilitated by
the sure love of others and the emotional support it fosters, is shattered in
the most harmful way by extreme experiences of physical violence, such as
rape or torture, which-beyond the raw bodily pain-cause a loss of self56
confidence and trust in the world.
Self-respect (Selbstachtung) is the second form of practical relation-toself that Honneth considers essential for self-realization.5 7 Here, Honneth
has in mind, not so much the experience of having a good opinion of oneself, but rather one's sense of being a "morally responsible" agent capable
of acting autonomously based on reason.5 8 This notion has a strong Kantian ring to it: because dignity is something that all persons-as ends in
themselves-have in common, each person is to be recognized as an equal
citizen capable of making autonomous decisions.5 9 As Honneth argues,
there is a close link between having self-respect and being a bearer of legal
rights. 60 By according rights to all human beings equally, a just legal
framework protects individuals from exclusion from the category of "legal
49. See id. at 160-79.
50. See Axel Honneth, Recognition and Moral Obligation,64 Soc. REs. 16, 27 (1997)
[hereinafter Recognition and Moral Obligation].
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. HONNETH, supra note 35, at xiii.
54. Id. at 174.
55. See id. at 98-107.
56. See id. at 131-39.
57. Id. at xiv, 173-74.
58. Id. at 120-21.
59. Id. at xiv-xv.
60. See id. at 107-21.
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persons," that is, of morally responsible agents. 6 1 This form of legal recognition (that supports self-respect) has undergone significant changes over
time. 6 2 Although the struggle for civil and political rights dates from the
18th and 19th centuries respectively, social rights emerged in the 20th century from an understanding that certain basic conditions of social and economic welfare are required for human beings to exercise their capacity for
collective or personal self-determination. 6 3 Referring to this gradual
expansion of human rights, Honneth notes that legal recognition "means
more today than it possibly could have at the start of the evolution of mod64
ern law."
Finally, a third attitude toward oneself that is thought to be crucial for
identity-formation is self-esteem (Selbstschdtzung). 65 Unlike self-respect,
which is a matter of viewing oneself as bearer of equal rights, self-esteem
involves resources for thinking about one's way of life as something that is
meaningful and significant. 66 As Honneth suggests, the sense of being
socially worthwhile can be seriously damaged if a socio-cultural environment is openly hostile to considering one's lifestyle as a valuable contribution to the common good. 6 7 Because of their demoralizing effect on a
person's sense of having valuable capacities, systematic patterns of exclusion and denigration undermine the social conditions for developing selfesteem and pose a threat to the real opportunity for self-realization. 68 For
Honneth, "solidarity" is the form of recognition that is committed to protecting individuals against such threats of disrespect. 69 Solidarity, he
claims, provides the basis for a cultural climate in which every member of
society can build a sense of self-esteem by contributing to some shared
concern, interest, or value. 70 From this perspective, a good society is one
in which "every subject is free from being collectively denigrated, so that
one is given the chance to experience oneself to be recognized, in light of
'7 1
one's own accomplishments and abilities, as valuable for society."
These tripartite distinctions between modes of recognition (love,
rights, and solidarity) and types of practical relation-to-self (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) provide a basis for what Honneth calls
"a formal conception of ethical life" (formales Konzept von Sittlichkeit)-a
normative ideal of society where social actors can establish relations of
72
mutual recognition as social prerequisites for individual self-realization.
61. Id. at 80; see Recognition and Justice, supra note 40, at 359.
62. HONNETH, supra note 35, at 114-15.

63. Id. at 116.
64. Id. at 117.
65. Id. at xiv.
66. Id. at xvi.
67. Id. at 134.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 128-30.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 130.
72. Id. at 172-75. Honneth's conception of ethical is "formal" in that it "encompasses the qualitative conditions for self-realization that, insofar as they form general
prerequisites for the personal integrity of subjects, can be abstracted from the plurality
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It thereby opens up the theoretical space for social critique and collective
action aimed at ending patterns of disrespect. 73 For Honneth, such strug74
gles for recognition are at the heart of social justice in the fullest sense.
He argues for an alternative model of justice, firmly grounded in these
three central patterns of recognition. 75 On Honneth's understanding, the
justice of a society depends on "the degree of its ability to secure conditions of mutual recognition in which personal identity formation, and
hence individual self-realization, can proceed sufficiently well. ' 76 By
defining the conditions of a just society through principles that secure the
social conditions of mutual recognition, this conception of justice shifts
away from "liberal" conceptions of justice, like Rawls', that typically rely on
77
an individualistic understanding of rights and autonomy.
B. Margalit's Decent Society
The main thesis of Avishai Margalit's book, The Decent Society, is disarmingly simple: a good society is a decent society, and a society that is
decent is "one whose institutions do not humiliate people." 7 8 Margalit's
political philosophy focuses on a specific kind of injury, which he terms
"humiliation." 7 9 But this term, of course, stands in need of further clarification. What is it that makes us feel humiliated? When do we have reasons for considering something humiliating?
For Margalit, humiliation is an injury to self-respect-"respect a
human being deserves for the very fact of being human." 80 Margalit is concerned with a normative rather than a psychological sense of humiliation.8 1 People may feel humiliated without sound reasons or have sound
reasons for feeling humiliated without actually feeling humiliated. For a
person to be humiliated in a normative sense, however, there must be a

82
sound reason for that person to think his or her self-respect injured.

of all particular forms of life." Id. at 175. Honneth claims that the three patterns of
recognition constituted by love, rights, and solidarity are "defined in a sufficiently
abstract, formal manner to avoid raising the suspicion that they embody particular
visions of the good life." Id. at 174.
73. Id. at 175-79.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 174.
76. Recognition and Justice, supra note 40, at 354.
77. For a conception of autonomy articulated in terms of a theory of mutual recognition, see Joel Anderson & Axel Honneth, Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice, in AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS 127 (John Christman
& Joel Anderson eds., 2005).
78. MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 1. For insightful and critical discussions, see Allen,
supra note 16; Frederic Schick, On Humiliation, 64 Soc. RES. 131 (1997).
79. MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 9.
80. Id. at 19. Some critics have raised doubts whether it makes sense to think of
humiliation in terms of the reduction, diminution, or impairment of self-respect, rather
than respect. See Anthony Quinton, Humiliation,64 Soc. RES. 77, 95-97 (1997) (arguing
that the essence of humiliation is not the injury to self-respect but the failure to give
people the respect that is their due).
81. MARGA[IT, supra note 34, at 9.
82. For a good illustration of this aspect of Margalit's work, see Allen, supra note 16,
at 354.
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According to Margalit, the sense of humiliation is normatively justified
when one is treated as subhuman, rejected from the human commonwealth, or deprived of one's basic sense of self-control (three senses of
humiliation which are related rather than separate). 83 Humiliation, so
defined, involves rejecting human beings as full-fledged humans-treating
them as if they were inferior beings, objects, beasts, or children who will
84
never grow up.
Margalit's concept of humiliation cannot function without some
notion of human dignity.8 5 "Humiliation," he writes, "is a concept based
on contrast, and the opposite of humiliation is the concept of respect for
humans."8 6 But what are the grounds of human dignity and non-humiliation? Although Margalit does not dismiss positive accounts of respect, he
relies on a negative and skeptical justification for human dignity based
simply on the idea that preventing cruelty, including humiliation, is "the
paradigm example of moral behavior" which requires no additional
87
justification.
As Margalit stresses, a decent society is not reducible to a Rawlsian
type of just society.88 Although a Rawlsian just society is a decent society
"in spirit" (where self-respect is the primary good), it is not necessarily a
decent society "according to the letter."8 9 As Margalit notes, in some cases
the distribution of goods may be just and efficient, yet still inhumane and
humiliating in the way in which it occurs: "We might, for instance, see
people distributing food to famine victims in Ethiopia throw the food out of
the truck as if the recipients were dogs, while still making sure that all the
recipients get their just portion in an efficient manner." 90 According to
Margalit, this behavior illustrates
an old fear that justice may lack compassion and might even be an expression of vindictiveness. There is a suspicion that the just society may become
mired in rigid calculations of what is just, which may replace gentleness and
human consideration in simple human relations. The requirement that a
just society should also be a decent one means that it is not enough for
goods to be distributed justly and 1efficiently-the style of their distribution
9
must also be taken into account.

At this point, one should briefly mention three issues that Margalit
discusses in The Decent Society: citizenship, bureaucracy, and punish83. MARGALIT,

supra note 34, at 108-29.

84. Id. at 89, 121.

85. Id. at 51-53.
86. Id. at 149.
87. Id. at 88.
88. See id. at 281.
89. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSnCE (rev. ed. 1999). Rawls defines
self-respect (or, interchangeably for him, self-esteem) as having two aspects: first, a person's sense of his own worth, the belief that "the conception of his good, his plan of life,
is worth carrying out;" and second, "a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within
one's power, to fulfill one's intentions." Id. at 386.
90. MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 280.

91. Id. at 280-81.
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ment. 92 Margalit claims that a decent, non-humiliating society does not
injure what he calls the "civic honor" of its citizens. 93 In such a society,
there are no second-class citizens. 9 4 "[S]econd-class citizenship involves
not only depriving people of essential resources and being unwilling to
share authority but also the idea that second-class citizens are not in
essence whole human beings ....

-95 One form of second-class citizenship

96
is the denial of full citizenship rights to someone who is in fact a citizen.
As for bureaucracy, Margalit says it creates potential new ways of treating
human beings as nonhuman. 9 7 One way of expressing this modern,
"bureaucratic," type of humiliation is through the idea of turning human
beings into faceless, anonymous numbers. 98 This occurs, for instance,
"when the only identity traits recognized by the society's institutions for an
individual or a group are the numerical tags." 9 9 "Punishment," finally, "is
the litmus test of the decent society." 10 0 As Margalit suggests, the question
we need to ask is whether it is possible to think about punishment without
any inherent association with humiliation. 10 1 In other words: how can we
"transform the idea of the disgrace inherent in punishment into a concept
involving only the loss of social honor without personal humiliation as
well[?]" 10 2 For Margalit, there is only one conceptual answer to this problem: a decent society cares about the dignity of the inmates of its
prisons. 103

C.

Unpacking the Concepts: Four Lines of Argument

Having given a broad (and admittedly cursory) overview of Axel Honneth's and Avishai Margalit's theories of social criticism, the question is
now why and how these works may be relevant to normative reflection on
"transitional justice." First, to lay some groundwork for the development of
my argument, it is important to call attention to the following four aspects
emerging from a critical reading of The Struggle for Recognition and The
Decent Society.

10 4

The first aspect is the emphasis these works place on "negative morality" by building normative reflection through an explicit analysis of nega92. See id. at 150-61, 212-21, 262-70.
93. Id. at 151.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 152.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 215.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 220.
100. Id. at 262. For Margalit, punishment is an important test case for a decent society because it provides so many opportunities for humiliation. See id. at 262-63. Punishment, however, may also be important as a response to the humiliating aspects of
wrongdoing. For an insightful discussion of this issue, see Arthur Ripstein, Responses to
Humiliation, 64 Soc. RES. 90, 95-97 (1997).
101. MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 262-63.
102. Id. at 269.
103. Id. at 262.
104. HONNETH, supra note 35; MARGALIT, supra note 34.
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tive moral concepts such as injustice, evil, vice, cruelty, humiliation, and so
forth.' 0 5 This "realistic" approach to morality, sensitive to people's everyday experiences of injury or humiliation, is a powerful and relevant one,
particularly in the context of reckoning with past wrongs. Indeed, one can
specify the very notion of "transitional justice" negatively, as primarily
concerned with the eradication or minimization of intolerable (radical)
social evils perpetrated on a massive scale. If we think of the most extreme
and radical forms of evil-genocides, massacres, mass rape, and death
camps-as efforts to undermine the very idea of shared humanity (the
foundation of morality itself), then it seems adequate to put negative phenomena at the start of our moral reflection. Without this change in perspective, we might miss the "negative essence" of those nightmarish
episodes from which transitional societies try to recover. Traumatic history involves a deep sense of injustice, suffering, loss, disrespect, and
humiliation; we must start from here, rather than operating in an abstract
space filled with positive principles. What does it mean to feel humiliated,
abandoned, betrayed, lost? By paying attention to these basic moral emotions, rather than ignoring them, we might gain a deeper understanding of
positive notions of dignity, integrity, respect, and so on. More importantly,
however, a focus on negative morality might allow us to avoid distorted
moral priorities. As Margalit noted, there is asymmetry between eradicating evil and promoting good.1 0 6 Creating positive wellbeing is desirable.
Stopping cruelty and humiliation is imperative.
The second aspect concerns the view that people's self-identity and
self-respect necessarily depend on the sustaining attitudes of others. 10 7 As
both Honneth and Margalit suggest, we do not establish a sense of self in
isolation but in interaction with other people: it is with, and through,
10 8
others that we can maintain sense of who we are and what we do.
Human beings need the validation or approval of others and are riddled
with anxiety if they do not receive it. One's attitude towards oneself, then,
is vulnerable to disruptions in one's relationships with others. 10 9 Thus,
practices and institutions that express attitudes of denial and obliviousness
threaten our sense of self-worth. Although it might be psychologically possible to maintain a sense of self-worth in the face of external depreciation
and humiliation, for most of us it is difficult to do so. Even if some people
might be able to shield themselves from such negative attitudes, the costs
105. See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 131-39, 160-79; MARGALIT, supra note 34, at
9-27, 89-114.
106. See MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 9-27, 89-114.
107. See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 92-130, 138; MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 124.
108. See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 92-130, 138; MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 124.
109. Charles Taylor, another prominent contemporary theorist of recognition, makes
this point eloquently when he writes,
The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence,
often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can
suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror
back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS
OF RECOGNITION 25, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
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associated with these efforts to preserve a sense of self-respect are likely to
be significant. Furthermore, this immediately prompts the question of
whether imposing such a burden would be just and fair.
This brings me to the third aspect of Margalit's and Honneth's work:
the claim that moral cruelty-the infliction of emotional or psychological
scars-can constitute a serious injury, sometimes equitable to physical cru0
elty. 1"
As Margalit explains, human beings are creatures that "live in symbols," and humiliation-as mental cruelty-is a distinctively human form
of injury. 1 1' Although' 1physical
cruelty is what people generally fear most,
"scars of humiliation" 2 may heal more slowly than physical scars: such
deep emotional wounds, inflicted by all sorts of insulting and disrespectful
conduct, may "keep bleeding long after the painful physical injuries have
crusted over." ' 1 3 The trauma of humiliation, like a covered stain, can have
long-lasting effects and leave invisible scars and wounds behind, beyond
the mere physical pain once experienced. Margalit's account of a decent
society has the merit of making such psychological injuries, particularly in
their institutional manifestation, a central and distinctive concern of political ethics." 4 It shows that the non-humiliating, decent society is a political ideal in its own right, one that is not reducible to a Rawlsian model of
distributive justice. 115
The fourth and last aspect concerns the human need for recognition,
and the moral significance and nature of this notion. 1 1 6 Although both
Margalit and Honneth seem to agree that human beings need some kind of
positive recognition by others, and that people can justifiably be said to
suffer moral injury from refusals to grant such recognition, Honneth is
much more explicit on this point. 11 7 In an article written in 1997, Honneth argues that Margalit's social ideal of non-humiliation and decency
commits him to something like a theory of recognition: "[A] decent society
would be a society whose institutional practices and measures respect all
the subjects affected in the sense that each can see him- or herself recognized as a member of the human community." 1 18 In this view, a treatment
is disrespectful or humiliating because it conveys a refusal to recognize
someone's dignity and status as a human being of equal worth. 1 9 Humiliation, as Honneth defines it, is a matter of being denied a certain status in
communion with others. 120 It evokes painful feelings of being ignored, of
not being taken seriously, of being denied a voice or being refused an ear,
110. See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 135-39; MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 84-88.
111. See MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 166, 89-112.
112. Id. at 87.
113. AViSHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 120 (2002) [hereinafter THE ETHICS OF
MEMORY].

114. See MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 189-270.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 271-91.
HONNETH, supra note 35, at 143; see MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 119-26.
HONNETH, supra note 35, at 143-44; see MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 124.
Recognition and Moral Obligation, supra note 50, at 18.
See id.; see also MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 89-112.
See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 131-39; Recognition and Moral Obligation, supra

note 50, at 18.
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of being cut out of the conversation with your fellows.12 1 When a person
is denied the possibility of ever being recognized as a valuable contributor
to some shared project, and when that person is treated as though his presence counts for nothing, it is natural for him to experience a serious lack of
respect or decency. 12 2 In this sense, "non-humiliation" involves being
23
granted recognition by others whom one also recognizes.'
These four aspects drawn from Margalit's and Honneth's work prepare
some groundwork for supporting the basic claim of this article: that recognition, as a principled commitment to the reduction of humiliation and
moral cruelty, is a central factor in restoring a minimally decent order in
the aftermath of mass atrocity. Societies emerging from such traumatic
episodes face situations of extreme complexity, replete with moral possibilities and dangers. 124 One obvious danger is that the perspective of the
victimized, their sense of injustice or humiliation, may be ignored or not
appropriately taken into account. 1 25 Another danger is the tendency to
humiliate the people designated as perpetrators by-among other thingstreating them as mere categories or negative stereotypes. 126 Societies
resurfacing from an evil past have a special vulnerability to a certain kind
of symbolic depreciation-submitting people to the pain of being ignored,
of not counting, of being treated as if central features of one's very existence need not be taken into account.1 27 In what follows, this article takes a
closer look at this phenomenon referred to here, in preliminary formulation, as misrecognition.
II.

A Phenomenology of Recognition

A.

Misrecognizing the Victims

One central element in serious wrongdoing, and what makes it disrespectful or humiliating, is symbolic devaluation: the wrongdoer's actions
not only cause the victim physical suffering or material loss, but also betoken an absence of respect and manifest a profound lack of concern. 128
121. See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 131-39.
122. See Recognition and Moral Obligation, supra note 50, at 23-24.
123. See id. at 27.
124. See generally PRISCILLA B.

-IAYNER,

UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS (2002) (discussing transi-

tions in societies recovering from human rights abuses and atrocities); Angela Hegarty,
Truth, Law and Official Denial: The Case of Bloody Sunday, in TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND
COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH 199, 206-08

(William A. Schabas & Shane Darcy eds., 2004) (exploring accountability and truth in
the context of Bloody Sunday).
125. See Avishai Margalit, Decent Equality and Freedom: A Postscript, 64 Soc. RES. 147,
149-53 (1997) [hereinafter Decent Equality and Freedom].
126. See Jodi Halpern & Harvey M. Weinstein, Empathy and Rehumanization After
Mass Violence, in My NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND
MASS ATROCITY, supra note 2, at 303.

COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF

127. See Decent Equality and Freedom, supra note 125, at 148 ("[Ilnequality symbolically expresses an attitude of downgrading-the view that the other is inferior in the
social hierarchy.").
128. See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND

MERCY 35, 44 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988).
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Appealing to Jean Hampton's view, we may characterize such wrongful
actions as conveying a message of moral insignificance; the victims are
treated as if they simply do not matter, as if they need not be taken into
account.1 29 These actions, in turn, involve a certain form of mistreatment
that we may refer to as "misrecognition" (or non-recognition)-a specific
attitude of treating others as inferior, minor, negligible, or simply invisible;
the sense of
possibly inflicting psychic injuries and, ultimately, damaging
1 30
basic self-respect on which healthy human agency depends.
Still, this is not the whole of it. When collective evils occur and mass
violence or totalitarian terror tears apart whole social fabrics, those
wronged suffer an additional injustice of misrecognition-they are ignored,
silenced, smothered, and suppressed from the public eye.' 3 1 By silencing
the victims, their personal and social grievances have no reality. Thus,
one's suffering is reduced to a clandestine experience-overlooked and forone can
gotten. 132 This sort of treatment adds insult to injury,13and
3
describe its devastating effects as "the wounds of silence."'
But misrecognition, as a matter of treating victims as though they are
not what they actually are, may even occur in the aftermath of mass atrocity. This is the crucial issue for transitional justice. In periods of transition, marked by radical transformations of the surrounding societies, there
is always a strong impulse to put the past aside and move on. Yet, failing to
recognize past wrongs exacerbates the trauma. 134 It couples the pain of
those experiences with the disbelief of the wider community. In cases of
outright denial or partial acknowledgement, the initial wound of insult and
humiliation develops into "a second wound of silence"-a deep sense of
hurt stemming from the feeling that "people condone the wrongs and do
not care about the baneful results."'1 3 5 While the wounds of humiliation
and pain are still bleeding, insult is added to injury by the denial of
recognition.
This is not merely a psychological or factual observation; it also lays a
moral claim. Due recognition is something we owe the victims of injustice,
and when it is lacking the victims have moral reasons for feeling insulted or
humiliated. The best way of construing this claim is to advance a negative
justification for recognition based on Margalit's argument that the preven129. See id. at 60.
130. See Trudy Govier, What is Acknowledgment and Why is it Important?, in DILEMMAS
OF RECONCILIATION: CASES AND CONCEPTS, supra note 5, at 65, 82-83 [hereinafter What is
Acknowledgement].
131. See J.M. Bernstein, Suffering Injustice: Misrecognition as Moral Injury in Critical
Theory, 13 INT'LJ. PHIL. STUD. 303, 311 (2005).

132. See Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What Can Truth Commissions Do?, in
TRUTH v. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 5, at 235, 244 ("The

clandestine nature of torture and abuse by repressive governments or insurgent groups
compounds the physical pain with the disbelief by the community, and at times by the
victims themselves.") [hereinafter Hope for Healing].
133. See What is Acknowledgement, supra note 130, at 83.
134. See Hopefor Healing, supra note 132, at 242 (referring to Judith Herman's theory
of trauma and recovery).
135. What is Acknowledgement, supra note 130, at 85.
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tion of cruelty, including mental cruelty, is at the very heart of morality.
As Margalit holds, human beings are susceptible to symbolic suffering that
involves no physical pain, and yet there is nothing metaphorical about the
mental pain that certain acts of symbolic meaning can inflict. 136 Clearly
symbolic devaluation is present in the type of misrecognition described
above. When recognition is withheld, victims of injustice are subjected to
the symbolic injury of being ignored-of being rendered passive, powerless,
voiceless, or simply invisible in matters that deeply affect them as human
beings. 137 This is a distinctive way of mistreating people, and if the
essence of morality is the aim of eliminating suffering, 138 then this treatment is also morally relevant.
The question, then, is what misrecognition could mean in the present
context. If we see the primary task of morality as negative, as a principled
commitment to minimizing the impact of cruelty on individual lives, then
we may first approach the problem negatively-that is, by identifying the
sorts of treatment that undermine or deny recognition rather than promote
it. Focusing on "negative morality" may put us in a better position to
explain what recognition is and why it is important for the victims of
wrongdoing for, as Margalit notes, it is often easier to "recognize what is
wrong with something without having a clear idea, or any idea at all, about
139
what is right with it."'
We might begin our exploration or "mapping" of recognition by contrasting it with denial. As individuals and groups, we are often unwilling to
acknowledge our errors, shortcomings, and failings. 140 There are many
ways of denying or deceiving ourselves about what we would prefer to forget, or continue to ignore. 14 1 Self-deceptive mechanisms of many kinds
enable people to avoid focusing on the events, or at least on the shameful
features of events. Similarly, societies can be said to "live in denial" when
their institutions, or those who run and support these institutions, are
engaged in misrepresenting or concealing unwelcome truths about past
wrongs. A consequence of this kind of collective denial is, so to speak, the
suppression of the victims' point of view from the public record. It transmits a message that, in the society's scheme of things, those wounded physically or spiritually count for nothing; that their experiences of unbearable
deep suffering and dread have no public significance; that their voices of
despair and anger have no worth and will not be heard. As Harry Frankfurt explains, this way of treating people is disrespectful and may trigger
painful feelings of resentment:
136. See Decent Equality and Freedom, supra note 125, at 148.
137. See Bernstein, supra note 131, at 311.
138. See id. at 304 ("Philosophy is the discursive expression of the forms of wrong of
needless human suffering in the midst of the continuing requirement for an acknowledgement of unpreventable suffering.").
139. THE ETHICS

OF MEMORY,

supra note 113, at 113.

140. See id. at 130.
141. See What is Acknowledgement, supra note 130, at 72-77 (discussing denial and
ignorance generally).
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People who resent disrespectful treatment do so because, by its very nature,
it conveys a refusal to acknowledge the truth about them. Failing to respect
someone is a matter of ignoring the relevance of some aspect of his nature or
of his situation. The lack of respect consists in the circumstance that some
important fact about the person is not properly attended to or is not taken
appropriately into account. In other words, the person is dealt with as
though he is not what he actually is. The implications of significant features
of his life are overlooked or denied. Pertinent aspects of how things are with
him are treated as though they had no reality. It is as though, in denying
142
suitable respect, his very existence is reduced.

Crucial here is the idea that people are treated disrespectfully when
significant elements of their lives are not properly attended to or not appropriately taken into account. 14 3 This way of looking at the matter helps
explain what it means for people to be denied recognition. What makes
treatment disrespectful, in Harry Frankfurt's view, is that it deprives people of the attention, consideration, or concern to which they are entitled by
virtue of what they are or of what they have done. 1 4 4 Therefore, lack of
respect exists if the realities of a person's condition, her or his own interests and needs, are simply ignored or overlooked. This way of treating people denies them the basic recognition of who they are and of who they have
been, also known as misrecognition or non-recognition.
It is easy to avoid seeing or paying attention to those one does not
wish to see. Most pertinently for the present topic, it is easy to overlook the
victims of collective cruelty, especially if we have shared some responsibility for what they experienced. Overlooking the individual victims means,
here, dealing with them as though they are not what they actually arehuman beings who have suffered severe violence and persecution and
carry unhealed wounds. It is a matter of intentionally failing to respond to
these people's real or presumed interests and needs. One can see this as a
fundamental assault upon the victims' personal reality, locking them into a
14 5
distorted and false mode of being.
Misrecognition may take various forms, some more subtle than others.
All forms, however, have much to do with the phenomenon that Axel Honneth describes as "social invisibility."' 14 6 "Social invisibility" refers to "a
form of being made invisible, of being made to disappear, that evidently
involves not a physical non-presence, but rather non-existence in a social
sense."' 147 What makes people socially invisible, on this account, is the
experience of being "looked through" by others, powerfully described, as
Honneth notes, in Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man. 1 48 Social invisibility, as
Honneth understands it, brings together cognition and evaluation-it is a
142. Harry Frankfurt, Equality and Respect, 64 Soc. REs. 3, 12 (1997).
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 25 (describing what is referred to here as misrecognition or non-recognition).

146. Axel Honneth, Invisibility: On the Epistemology of 'Recognition,' PROC.
SOC'Y 111, 111 (Supp. LXXV 2002) [hereinafter Invisibility].
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matter of both seeing who someone is and of negating what we see, of not
14 9
letting that knowledge matter to our conduct in one way or another.
Honneth suggests that we think of Ellison's Invisible Man; he is a real "flesh
and blood" man, visible to the physical eye, but he is "invisible" to the
"inner eye" of those who look through him unrelentingly. 150 What is
expressed as overlooking the presence of the other is not the failure to accurately perceive people as who they really are, but rather the motivational
readiness to treat the other in a way that denies her or him "the status of a
15 1
full partner in social interaction."'
But what, exactly, does it mean to see "through" the victimized? Perhaps a helpful way of approaching this question is through the concept of
normality-seeing something as usual, typical, or expected, and not
demanding special attention. Within this perspective, to see "through" the
victims of injustice is to see as "normal" what was done to them. Reduced
to the normal, their suffering is made to look "little" or even banal, rendering it invisible.' 52 What characterizes this way of treating the victims is the
failure to face and address them as individuals, which one might describe
as bureaucratic. 153 As Margalit notes, the term "bureaucracy" is conceptually linked with a lack of personal attitude; bureaucratic systems are
"based on impersonal relations, and so they are indifferent to individuals
and their suffering and remote from their individuality and uniqueness." 154 There is, in other words, a tendency in bureaucracies to depersonalize people, to treat them-so to speak-as numbers or application
forms. According to Margalit, this attitude of seeing "through" people is
''l
"humiliating in its very essence. 55
More should be said about this distinctive way of misrecognizing the
victims, namely about its symbolic character. Only by directing our attention to negative symbolism can we gain a more detailed view of misrecognition and its impact on victims' lives. "Negative symbolism" refers to acts or
gestures that express an attitude of downgrading or degrading: projecting
an image of the other as inferior, excluded, wholly other, unworthy of
respect and consideration, or simply invisible. Needless to say, there are
many ways of imposing a depreciatory image upon people and some of
them may be less unacceptable than others. Still, when applied to the victims of horrific wrongdoing, this sort of negative symbolism risks being as
devastating as the original wrong itself.
One can feel symbolic devaluation, in the sense that is pertinent here,
in a variety of ways. At the core, however, symbolic devaluation is intimately tied up with what African American political thinker W.E.B. Du
Bois describes as "this sense of always looking at one's self through the
149.
150.
1995)
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id. at 111; see RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN xxix (2d ed., Vintage International

(1952).
Fraser, supra note 36, at 27.
See MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 89-118.
See id.
Id. at 215.
Id.
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eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on
in amused contempt and pity."'1 56 To be regarded with "amused contempt"
means, among other things, to be ridiculed and dismissed-the victimized
person is subjected to risible treatment.' 5 7 A much less overt form of symbolic devaluation is pity. 1 58 In speaking of pity, and distinguishing it from
compassion, Margalit holds that it expresses a sense of superiority ("It happened to you, but it can't happen to me") and triggers helplessness and
vulnerability, which gives its recipients a sound basis for feeling humiliated.' 59 Thus, pity is associated with the attitude of almsgivers: the sort of
condescending behavior accorded to those begging for charity. 160 To be
pitied, then, is to be deprived of respect-to be seen as less than fully adult
or human. 16 1 That is why we (as individuals and as an organized society)
should not pity the victimized but ensure, as far as we can, that they enjoy
an institutional basis for self-respect.
B. Elements of Recognition
Having set out a phenomenology of misrecognition in general terms,
we now continue our investigation by exploring recognition as a positive
concept. In relating the preceding analysis to a discourse of recognition,
we shall concentrate on what turned out to be a central element in misrecognition-invisibility. As we have seen, there are various ways of "looking through" those shattered by serious forms of collective violence, but
now we look at the reverse side of the phenomenon. What is it to render
"visible" the victimized? How can a society achieve this "visibility"?
Honneth suggests an initial response to this issue. In his view, our
identity as full and "visible" members in social life depends crucially on
the presence of "positive forms of expression" that involve something
"added" to mere perception-an attitude of both seeing who someone is
and of affirming what we see, of taking notice of something or someone in
a positive sense (for example, stopping and saying hello rather than walking by in anonymity). 162 In this way, social visibility comes to be bound
up with forms of direct and interpersonal communication that are
grounded in and expressive of the approval or validation of others. Perhaps
Thomas Nagel best captures this idea with what he once called, in another
context, "the maintenance of a direct interpersonal response to the people
156. Steven Lukes, Humiliation and the Politics of Identity, 64 Soc. RES. 36, 46 (1997)
(quoting W.E.B. DUBOis, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 2 (Dover 1994) (1903)).

157. Take, for example, the incident of "the laughing UN judges" which became frontpage news in Rwanda. This incident occurred on October 31, 2001, when three judges
at the International Tribunal in Arusha suddenly burst out laughing during the crossexamination of a Tutsi rape victim. See Ann McFerran, Violated and Isolated, THE SUNDAY
TIMES MAG. (London), Apr. 4, 2004, at 1.
158. See MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 233-34.

159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
See id. at 233-35.
See id.
See HONNETH, supra note 35.
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163
one deals with."

This article extends this line of questioning by applying it to the specific context of transitional justice and victims' demands for recognition.
To recognize the victims is to manifest an affirmative attitude to them,
directly and specifically, in response to their special situation. Put more
simply-and to borrow Nagel's phrase-it is to provide them with a "direct
interpersonal response." 164 This provides a working definition of "recognition" that will help identify the issues that need to be addressed. The
underlying assumption here is roughly that to do something horrible to
someone puts you in special relation to him and therefore requires a
response that can be offered to that person as a subject and received by him
as a true response to his personal needs and claims. 16 5 As such, three
points are in order.
First, recognition requires a proper response to serious wrongdoing
(the criterion of responsiveness). 1 66 Responding to something means, in
the first instance, manifesting our awareness of some antecedent state of
affairs. It entails acknowledging the truth about some aspects of the worldarticulating to ourselves and to others what we know. Thus, to recognize
my wrongdoing, and to respond to it, is to face up to what I have done and
address the factors or motives that let me commit the wrong. I admit and
avow my past wrongdoing and take responsibility for it. I acknowledge as
mine that harmful action and choose words to describe it adequately. Crucial here is the communicative nature of the process of responding. By
retelling the wrong and admitting to the knowledge of it, I manifest a certain attitude towards the person who suffered because of me: your pain and
suffering is real and I accept responsibility for it. This acknowledgment
brings us to a central element of what is involved in responding: the adoption of stance that grants recognition to another person's reality. In other
words, it is a matter of opening one's mind towards the other's experience,
and seeing the world from his or her particular perspective. As a response
to serious wrongdoing, it is simply not good enough to say, "Yes, I did all
these things to you and so what?" Rather, it is necessary to seek the perspective of the victimized other, to see the experience through his eyes by
asking "What is it to him?" The basic idea is that of "putting myself in his
shoes," and it is this placement of myself in a position similar to that of my
victim that enables me to say things like "Yes, what I did was wrong, and it
should never have happened."' 6 7 For this to occur, I must be prepared not
only to recognize the suffering and pain of those whom I wronged but,
above all, to listen to their voices of despair and indignation, carefully and
seriously.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
soning

67 (1979).
Id.
See id. at 68.
See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 131-39.
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Second, the kind of recognition that is an adequate response to crime
should come from the offender and be presented directly to the victim (the
criterion of directness). 16 8 Although others might criticize the offender for
what he did or might provide material help or sympathetic support to the
victim, only the offender himself can accept or assume responsibility by
admitting that there is no way of justifying to the victim what was done to
him. Furthermore, the wrongdoer must offer recognition to the victim specifically, rather than just to the world at large. To explain why this might
be so, we begin by observing that hostility or aggression involves a direct
and straightforward relation with the particular person at whom it is
directed. 169 The act of violence is aimed specifically against that person,
rather than against another, and manifests a direct attitude towards him as
the target of the hostility. 170 Thus, the transgressor stands in direct moral
relation to the person wronged, and that relation involves a moral debt
owed by the transgressor to that person. Because of this direct connection
between wrongdoer and the wronged, any response to wrongdoing risks
being irrelevant or insufficient if it fails to speak and give special attention
to the one who has been injured. Thus, if recognition is to occur, the culpable offender's reaction has to be such that it can be offered to the victim
and received by him as a direct response to his specific situation and
needs. In this sense, it is the moral responsibility of the offender to take
concrete and immediate action that can address the damage done to the
victim in a direct way.
Third, the perpetrator's response should take the form of an interpersonal reaction that the wrongdoer offers to the victim as a response to the
wrongdoer's special relation to him or her (the criterion of personal interaction). 17 1 As Thomas Nagel argues, "to treat someone else horribly puts
you in a special relation to him, which may have to be defended in terms of
other features of your relation to him."' 172 What underlies this argument is
the idea that a crime or offence is an injury done to an individual human
being, rather than just to someone (i.e. a member, among countless others,
of a certain class of people) or something (i.e. an institution or public
role). 17 3 The point is that hostility or aggression is primarily a conflict
between persons. The aggressor's attack is addressed to a particular person and, as a result, it establishes a kind of I-You relation. For example,
through my hostile behavior, which aims to threaten your personal reality,
I put myself in a special relation to you. Therefore, one can construe the
discourse of recognition as essentially involving some sort of dialogical
encounter between the offender and the offended. To raise the jeopardized
relationship to the level of true dialogue, the offender must engage in a
process of addressing and facing the victim as the particular person at
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See id. at 67-68.
See id.at 66-68.
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whom the initial wrong was directed. One might think here of recognition
as a form of personal confrontation: the perpetrator is required to come
forward and explain his actions to the victim who, in turn, may confront
him directly and explicitly. Perhaps, this kind of exchange reveals itself
most clearly in face-to-face interaction. We might indeed say, with reference to Emmanuel Levinas, that the very sense of moral responsibility, in
its original form of response and recognition, manifests itself most
1 74
urgently in the encounter with "the face of the other" (le visage d'autrui).
In the light of this analysis, recognition is best described as a verbal
act in which the speaker expresses that he morally regrets doing what he
did. In recognizing his wrongdoing, the offender takes the victim's side,
accepts responsibility, and admits the absence of good reasons for his
harmful acts. 175 Understood this way, the act of recognition bears some
resemblance to an offer of apology. Saying "I apologize" in the context of
wrongdoing implies recognition of the injury and thereby of the moral status of the injured. Although sincere expressions of sorrow and regret are
commonly viewed as vital to an apology that one individual offers to
another, these and other subjective elements are not part of the model of
recognition proposed here. Rather, the model of recognition proposed here
involves the performance of a behavior that can be reasonably interpreted
as expressing moral regret, regardless of whether the actor is really motivated by sentiments of guilt, remorse, or shame. Therefore, it is not necessary for the offender to be emotionally engaged to complete the process.
Although it might be better (for the victims and for the goal of reconciliation) if the offender is sincerely repentant, the mere doing of certain
"performative" acts or rituals brings about recognition. 1 76
1II.
A.

Interpersonal Recognition in the Public Sphere
A Process of Triadic Interaction

So far, the focus has been on individual acts of recognition (one
human being to another), which typically involve local, face-to-face relations. Thus, the account of recognition I have given appears to be a form of
174. See

EMMANUEL

LEVINAS,

TOTALITY
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INFINITY:
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(Alphonso Lingis trans., 1969).
175. Following an idea expressed by Thomas Nagel, we might say that this process
depends not on compassion, guilt, or any other interpersonal sentiment, but on the
human capacity to imagine what the world looks like from another's point of view. See
THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 82-84 (1970). The basic form that this
takes is the argument, "How would you like it if someone did that to you?" Applied to
the context of serious wrongdoing, this argument appeals to a hypothetical judgment,
which reveals an objective element in the concern we feel for ourselves: you would not
only dislike it if someone treated you like that, but you would resent it. See id. It is this
imaginative effort to put yourself in the other person's shoes that enables you to admit
that what you did was not justified in any sense that admits generalization; that you had
no reason to act as you did. See id.
176. This account is closely related to Christopher Bennett's concept of "ritual apology." See Christopher Bennett, Taking the Sincerity Out of Saying Sorry: Restorative Justice as Ritual, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 127, 133 (2006).
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"thick" or micro-level morality, suited solely to personal relations between
individuals, or perhaps small communities. This immediately prompts
questions concerning the application of recognition to the public realm.
How well does the account perform on the macro-level? Can it be transposed to more global relations within and among political communities,
which are often mediated by proxy? These concerns are nowhere better
placed than in the context of collective offenses carried out for political
purposes and perpetrated by state agents or representatives of political
groups.
As a tentative effort to address this issue, one must reiterate the simple
observation that crime is primarily an interpersonal matter. Doing terrible
things to someone-such as torturing or killing-puts you in a direct relation to that particular person: these things happen to him as a result of what
you do. The same seems true at the level of public crimes. After all, such
crimes are committed by individuals (rather than by "faceless" institutions),
whatever their specific role in political, economical, or military institutions. To be sure, it is always easy to cloak oneself in the responsibility of
one's office by saying that one was only following orders or doing one's
job. But, this does not seem right. Although the impersonal character of
public action may, at times, license some outcome-centered methods that
would not be permissible for individuals, there is no such thing as "a moral
cushion that insulates whatever else is done officially from moral
reproach." 17 7 In short, not everything that produces desirable results at a
larger scale is permitted. 178 There are basic moral constraints to what individuals may do in the conduct of their office, some of which are already
present at the level of individual morality (including prohibitions against
torture and deliberate killing). 179 This means, among other things, that
one cannot neatly divide issues of moral wrongdoing into spheres of the
private and personal, the political and public. 180
All of this, if true, suggests that there is something in the interpersonal
account of recognition I have offered which may belong in the lexicon of
societal responses to mass violence. That, of course, raises the question of
how such an account could be integrated into a system of public activities
and institutions. To begin this discussion, assume that for official recognition to occur, a society emerging from a repressive or strife-ridden past
should provide a safe, rule-governed space within which particular victims
can present their grievances, express a sense of injustice to some effect,
and "point a finger"-so to speak-at the offending parties or states of
affairs. Such a society should create public forums structured in ways to
enable the aggrieved party not only to "tell her own story" in the presence
of respectful listeners, but also to confront the offender and engage him in
serious discourse about what he has done (or not done) and said (or not
said). What is of crucial structural importance here is the intervention of a
177. NAGEL, supra note 163, at 90.
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third party, namely the state as the representative of society. It is through
such third-party intervention that the relatively private, dyadic offenderoffended relation is transformed into a public event, now subject to the
censure of the wider community.' 8 1 Apart from expanding the universe of
discourse, this procedure allows for a kind of collective monitoring or surveillance and serves to publicly recall and reaffirm the collective's moral
position whose integrity has been tested and challenged by the
2
8

transgression. 1

To elaborate, the process proposed here is, roughly, a process of triadic interaction in which the state or "collective other" emerges as a kind of
moral stand-in, or authority figure, whose role consists of initiating and
monitoring the appropriate behavioral procedures that are conducive to
recognizing the victim's moral injuries. This process would involve some
formalized ritual devised in a way that expresses publicly the offender's
recognition of the wrong she has done. As such, it requires the offender's
compliance with external, but not internal commitment. This is to say that
the offender is asked to perform certain rituals (for instance, making an
apology, making amends etc.) where sincerity may be uncertain or doubtful but that, qua performance, send a message to the victim acknowledging
her loss and reaffirming her dignity. What becomes of paramount importance in this context is the presence of the third parties as authoritative
spokespersons for the collectivity. Their presence allows for a kind of officially validated testimony and serves to demonstrate the community's solidarity with the victim.
To reconstruct the details of the process, let us bring into sharper
focus the distinctive roles of the three parties involved-victim, perpetrator,
183
and the state-and the nature of the relationships between them.
In a scheme of the kind envisioned here, the victim emerges as an
active participant in shaping the discourse of recognition, rather than a
passive auditor or observer. 1 84 That is to say that the victim comes to
assume the role of a primary stakeholder-actively and directly involved in
the ensuing exchange.' 85 The point of the process consists precisely in
giving voice to the aggrieved party by authorizing him, at specified stages,
to expose the details of the perpetrator's actions and bring his experience
of injustice out into the open. 18 6 The victim will have a chance to explain
how the crime affected him, speaking in tones that are not the neutral
181.

See

NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIA-

48, 54 (1991).
182. See id. at 54-55.
183. Nicholas Tavuchis' account of collective apology as a process of triadic interaction has influenced the model of recognition discussed in this article. See id. at 55-64.
The formulations in R. A. Duffs communicative theory of punishment and the ritualistic
view of restorative justice as elaborated by Christopher Bennett have also influence this
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184. See Bennett, supra note 176, at 127.
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tones of bare description, but tones that communicate to the perpetrator
his righteous hurt and anger. 18 7 Thus, through the victim's own account
of the injury, the aggressor will be vividly confronted with the harm he has
done. 18 8 Yet, for this confrontation to be possible, the injured party must
be empowered to speak out and to bring the offender to face the wrong he
has done. Empowerment of this sort will depend on the intervention of
committed and authoritative third parties (here, the state and its institutions), capable and willing to grant power to the victim-power to reclaim
his story and his dignity as a crucial step towards overcoming the
offender's unjustified dominance.
In this interactive context, the perpetratorplays a major role in what is
essentially a process of being confronted with, and having to respond
appropriately to, her own wrongdoing. 18 9 The process requires some formalized ritual undertaken by the perpetrator, a ritual of a kind that
expresses to those concerned her full recognition of the wrong she has
done. 19 0 In undergoing this ritual, the perpetrator is asked to "make up" to
the victim for what she did to him by performing certain actions-such as
making public statements of guilt or responsibility and offering reparation-whose significance resides precisely in their meaning as forceful
expressions of recognition. 19 1 Central to this process is a formality that
leaves open the question of sincerity. That is, the process is of a kind that
deals with the perpetrator only "externally," without inquiring into her
emotional engagements. 19 2 What matters, in other words, is that the perpetrator performs the appropriate behavior (by doing what she would do if
she were genuinely repentant), regardless of her motivation for doing
so. 1 9 3 In addition, it is worth noting that this process must be burdensome
for the perpetrator-by making demands on her liberty, money, time, or
energy-if it is to communicate a suitably weighty and forceful kind of
94

recognition. 1

Lastly, what invests the process with public meaning is the intervention of third parties whose functions are defined and circumscribed by the
goals and interests of the state as a legal embodiment of the political com187. DUFF, supra note 183, at 93.

188. See id.
189. The term "perpetrator" is used rather narrowly here to refer to those who are
involved in carrying out, directing, or closely assisting particular acts of violence. In
this usage, the role of "perpetrators" is different from that of "bystanders" and "backers"
of a regime (e.g., the broader, mainly white, population that supported and voted for
South Africa's apartheid regime), whatever their moral failings and responsibilities. This
distinction is not only terminological; it is an integral part of the proposed models of
recognition. While "interpersonal recognition" is a matter of addressing specific perpetrators, "collective recognition" shifts the focus to society as a whole and to those who,
actively or passively, supported and made possible the societal context in which violent
acts were undertaken. For an insightful discussion of the levels of perpetration, see
GOVIER, supra note 22, at 31-36 (arguing for a broader notion of perpetration).
190. See Bennett, supra note 176, at 127.
191. DUFF, supra note 183, at 98.

192. See Bennett, supra note 176, at 132.
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munity. Such intervention introduces new elements into the offenderoffended relationship by adding the authoritative voice of the law. Specifically, it involves a communal, authoritative condemnation of the offender's
crime that serves to recall and reaffirm the victim's moral and civic
worth. 19 5 In requiring the offender to take part in the public ritual, the
third-party authority expresses the community's opprobrium and demonstrates solidarity with the victim. 1 96 The authority makes a judgment, on

behalf of the society-at-large, that the action was wrong and that the
offender should feel sorry for it. 1 9 7 It vindicates the victim, asserting that
the state is not indifferent to her plight. 198 All this, clearly, is a demonstration of public commitment to the victim's dignity as an equal member in a
human community. 199
Before we proceed, let me pause to emphasize some of the main ideas
that underlie this process. First, the concept of recognition presented here
is "vindicatory" rather than "vindictive;" it is a matter of "putting right
what is wrong" rather than of seeking revenge. 200 Second, the communicative process can be understood as conveying a moral message connected
with validating the victim of wrongdoing. 20 ' Third, the community owes it
to the victim, as a matter of social solidarity, not only to recognize the
seriousness of the wrong done but also to expose the offender to censorial
or contemptuous judgment. 20 2 Fourth, the process must be burdensome
for the offender, not just for its own sake, but as a way of giving forceful
expression to the recognition of his wrongdoing (undertaking a task that
imposes little or no burden on him may not be adequate to the seriousness
of the wrong done). 20 3 Fifth, a formalistic, act-based process does not
make repentance or remorse a part of recognition (although it allows for
20 4
such positive emotional shifts).
In this context, recognition operates at various levels. It manifests
itself, for instance, at the level of justice as redistribution-justice primarily
committed to redistributing money or land in the form of reparations.
Moreover, it is closely allied to the requirements of legal justice. The rule of
law and the principle of equality before the law secure a kind of public
recognition for victims-recognition as equal right-bearers, who are able to
195.
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200.
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make claims. 20 5 But recognition, as interpreted here, demands something
more than mere legal justice-a somewhat symbolic acknowledgement that
expresses a sense of concern for the victim as an individual with a concrete
experience of suffering and harm. 20 6 Rather recognition requires acknowledging the specific truth about victims, addressing and facing them as concrete others. 20 7 Recognition is realized by looking at the victims' life
stories and grievances separately and individually, rather than by simply
recognizing them as abstract bearers of rights. 20 8 From this perspective,
justice as recognition employs a much richer version of each victim's point
of view than do ordinary, abstract models of justice grounded in the
requirements of juridical rationality, impersonality, fairness, and so on. It
is with this in mind that I speak here of recognition as "another kind of
'20 9
justice.
B. Trials versus Truth Commissions?
The process, as described above, appears to have some kinship with
that of an ordinary criminal trial. Most obviously, a criminal trial involves
censorial judgment about responsibility and guilt (which may or may not
open the accused to punishment). 2 10 That is, it calls a citizen to answer a
charge of wrongdoing, and in doing so, it provides for a formal response to
crime, administered through an institutionalized system of proceedings
and convictions rather than a purely informal process. 2 1' Such a process
is coercive in that it forces the offender to hear-even if he will not listen
to-an interpretation of his conduct as a public wrong and, once the charge
is proven against him, to be censured by a formal conviction. 2 12 It thus
makes clear, as R. A. Duff puts it, that "the wrong done to the individual
victim is also a wrong against the community, which shares that wrong and
whose values have been flouted." 2 13 This suggests that criminal courts can
play a crucial role in showing that society-at-large recognizes and takes
seriously the victim's condition as a victim.
205. For a helpful discussion of the relation between recognition and legal justice, see
BalancingJustice, supra note 201, at 328-32.
206. See id. at 331.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. The treatment of recognition here is inspired by a wonderfully perceptive article
written by Judith Shklar, in which she argues that normal legal justice-as rule-bound,
abstract justice-is frequently an inadequate way of recognizing victims and their personal sense of outrage. See generally THE FACES OF INJUSTICE, supra note 18. For a some-

what similar account of justice as recognition, see BalancingJustice, supra note 201, at
328-32; Andre du Toit, The Moral Foundationsof the South Africa TRC: Truth as Acknowledgment and Justice as Recognition, in TRUTH
SIONS, supra note 5, at 122, 135-39.

V. JUSTICE:

THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMIS-

210. See Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the InternationalCriminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801,

864 (2006).
211. See

DUFF,

supra note 183, at 72.

212. See id. at 72-73.
213. Id. at 114.
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Nonetheless, this still leaves open the role of the victim in criminal
prosecution. The victim's personal involvement is, as suggested above, an
aim internal to recognition. If this is so, then we need to take a closer look
at the victim's place in the criminal justice system. The issue is an important one, considering that criminal trials are often criticized as unresponsive to the victims' needs. 2 14 There is, I think, considerable force to this
critique of our existing criminal justice systems. After all, criminal trials
are primarily aimed at the determination of guilt or innocence, with the
focus on the accused. What underlies the process is a conception of crime
as a public matter and of the state as representing or replacing the victim. 215 In this scheme of things, the victim is left to play the role of an

outsider or, at best, of a minor player. Hence the claim, famously made by
Nils Christie and other advocates of restorative justice, that in modern
criminal systems the victim has become "a sort of a double loser"-"first,
vis-a-vis the offender, but secondly and often in a more crippling manner
by being denied rights to full participation in what might have been one of
the more important ritual encounters in life."'2 16 This is what Martha
Minow has in mind when she writes:
Trials focus on perpetrators, not victims. They consult victims only to illustrate the fact or scope of the defendants' guilt. Victims are not there for
public acknowledgement or even to tell, fully, their own stories. Trials interrupt and truncate victim testimony with direct and cross examination and
conceptions of relevance framed by the elements of the charges. Judges and
juries listen to victims
with skepticism tied to the presumption of defend2 17
ants' innocence.
Even so, none of this precludes the notion that current criminal procedures could be reformed to be more responsive to the victims' needs for
involvement and input into the decision-making process. Perhaps the
belief that trial procedure is by its very nature incapable of giving a voice to
the victim reflects just a failure of imagination. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge the revival of interest in victims of crime from the
1960s onward. 218 Under the influence of what one may fairly describe as
a victims' movement, most criminal justice systems in Western countries
have been reformed to ameliorate the victims' plight and provide victims
with various rights.2 19 Remarkably, there has been a strong trend toward
214. See, e.g., Ric Simmons, PrivateCriminalJustice,42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 913
(2007) ("lilt is becoming increasingly clear that the public criminal justice system is
inadequate on two counts: first, it makes almost no attempt to rehabilitate and reintegrate the perpetrators of crime; and second, it does not satisfy the needs of crime
victims.").
215. See Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice: An Empircally Grounded Movement
Facing Many Opportunities and Pitfalls, 8 CRDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 511, 514 (2007).
216. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1977).
217. Hope for Healing, supra note 132, at 238.
218. See Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Opening the Door of the CriminalJustice System to the Victim,
14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 839, 852-53 (1997).
219. These victim-friendly reforms reflect the standards codified by international
instruments. See Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice, supra note 22, 9 6(b) (requir-
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the integration of victims in all stages that impact the outcome of the case notwithstanding charging, dismissal of charges, plea-bargaining, or sentencing. 2 20 These types of victim-friendly initiatives mark an effort to
allow victims to advance their point of view more fully and to convey the
narrative of their experience. In such a way, these initiatives can lead to
the victims' recognition and restoration. 22 1 Empowering victims to have a
say at various decision-making stages not only gives them a sense of control, but also acknowledges the moral status of victims as equal citizens
222
and the legitimacy of their feelings of resentment and anger.
More to the point, trials hold potential for overcoming the objective
situations of dominance and powerlessness that crime-violent crime at
least-causes. 22 3 As already noted more generally, some forms of criminality not only inflict pain but also degrade or demean those who have been
wronged. 2 24 When one person is seriously wronged, she loses control over
her life to somebody else's violence and contempt, and she is disempowered-rendered helpless and passive-in matters of vital importance
to her. 2 25 The humiliation of this disempowerment, blatantly forced upon
the subject, lies "in the total subjugation to the pointless whims of the
subordinator's will. '"226 Hence, it is important to create a public space in
which individual victims can assume a position of security and power
ing that "the views and concerns of victims ... be presented and considered at appropri-

ate stages of the proceedings"); Eur. Consult. Ass., Recommendation of the Comm. of
Ministers on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure,
Doc. No. R (85) 11 (1985); EUR. FORUM FOR VICTIM SERVS., STATEMENT OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS
IN THE PROCESS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1996). Moreover, it is important to note that the
Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) contains many provisions that allow

victims to participate in the administration of justice in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Sam
Garkawe, Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues, 3 INT'L CRIM.
L. REV. 345, 352-53 (2003) (discussing the various victim measures that the ICC
adopted). On the rights of crime victims at the international level, see ERIC STOVER, THE

136-41 (2005).
220. See generally Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice
Process: Fifteen Years After the President's Task Force on the Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21 (1999) (surveying changes in procedural rights of
WITNESS: WAR CRIMES AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE

crime victims).

221. Cf.Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargainingand Victims: From Consultation to Guidelines, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 323, 326-27 (2007) (describing social science findings about
how a person's participation in an official decision affects the person's view of the fairness of the decision in the criminal justice context).

222. At the same time, however, this raises the deep and difficult issue of "making
sense" of the conflicts that may arise between the demand for increased victim participation and other claims or requirements (for instance, the right of the defendant to a fair
trial). The conclusion discusses the problem of moral conflict and the idea of "principled compromises" further.
223. George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 51, 58 (1999).
224. See HONNETH, supra note 35; MARGALIT, supra note 34; Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1821 (1999).
225. See John Braithwaite, Professor, Austl. Nat'l Univ., Dorothy J. Killam Memorial
Lecture at Dalhousie University: Restorative Justice and a Better Future (Oct. 17, 1996),
available at http://iirp.org/library/braithwaite.html ("[Dlisempowerment is part of the
indignity of being a victim of crime.").

226. Decent Equality and Freedom, supra note 125, at 158.
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while confronting their wrongdoers-a safe, rule-governed space in which
wrongs are correctly named and condemned so as to deny the position of
dominance or superiority claimed through unwarranted violence.
Trials may provide such a space. The basic notion of equality and
impartiality-of treating everybody with the same concern and respectmakes it a priority of criminal conviction to neutralize crime as a source of
dominance and restore the equality, balance, or equivalence that has been
disturbed by a wrongful act. 22 7 Moreover, the formalism of due process,

which establishes a clear separation of the wrongdoer from the victim
through strict rules of procedure, may help to avoid some dimensions of revictimization-the wounds a crime victim suffers when she is directly
exposed to the perpetrator's power to replay his role of torturer, murderer,
or rapist. 2 28 Therefore trials, as opposed to more informal or consensual
arrangements, may actually be better suited to restore the victims' sense of
power and control, and thus to overcome abusive relationships.
Given all this, the claim, and the hope, is that criminal trials can create
a rule-governed space within which a genuine discourse of recognition can
take place between the victim, the perpetrator, and society-at-large (represented by the government). This said, it is important to now turn to what
is often portrayed as a potential alternative to prosecutions-truth commissions. 229 These institutions, formed in many parts of the world including
East Timor, Ghana, Peru, and Sierra Leone, mark an effort between full
prosecution, on the one hand, and blanket amnesty, on the other. 230 The
chief concern here, is to establish a clear break with the past by "telling the
truth"- who did what to whom, and under whose orders. 23 1 There is an
227. See Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
1293, 1299 (2006).
228. As to these risks for victims still vulnerable to some dimensions of perpetrator
power, the case of Jeffrey Benzien-a confessed apartheid torturer who was compelled to
"demonstrate" his torture techniques during the amnesty hearing before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission-seems especially troubling. As Antjie Krog
suggests, Benzien actually replayed his role as torturer even while being confronted by
his former victims. ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL: GUILT, SORROW, AND THE LIMITS
OF FORGIVENESS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 95 (1999). "Within the first minutes," she
writes, "he manages to manipulate most of his victims back into the roles of their previous relationships-where he has the power and they the fragility." Id.; see also MINow,
supra note 1, at 130-31.
229. See MINOW, supra note 1, at 52-90; Anna Triponel, Can the Iraqi Special Tribunal
FurtherReconciliation in Iraq?, 15 CARDOzOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 277, 309 (2007) ("Truth
commissions have indeed been used by several countries to deal with past governments'
gross violations of human rights either as an alternative or as a complement to criminal
trials.").
230. See Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L
LEGAL PERSP. 73, 76-77 (2002) ("Because truth commissions eschew both criminal prosecution on the one hand and blanket amnesty on the other, they are often referred to as
a 'middle path' or 'third course' or 'golden mean."'); Jeremy Sarkin & Erin Daly, Too
Many Questions, Too Few Answers: Reconciliation in Transitional Societies, 35 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 661, 662-63 (2004) (listing countries that have established truth and
reconciliation commissions).
231. Brandon Hamber, Rights and Reasons: Challenges for Truth Recovery in South
Africa and Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1074, 1080 (2003).
CRIMINOLOGY
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underlying assumption that societies emerging from atrocity will be able to
distance themselves, and thus recover their integrity, only if the facts of the
past are made plain. 23 2 At the same time, however, there is a strong sense
that criminal trials would be equally threatening to the institutionalization
2 33
and consolidation of new democracies.
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), launched
in 1995 by a democratic legislative act (the Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act), is the most expansive and elaborate truth commission to date. 23 4 As an innovative and ambitious effort to combine the dis-

closure of factual findings, the quest for "dialogical" truth through open
hearings and public testimony, and the provision of amnesty to perpetrators who testify fully about their politically motivated crimes; the TRC process represents an important precedent for future commissions. 23 5 One of
the most distinctive elements of the South African TRC, in comparison to
prosecutions and previous truth commissions, was the emphasis on victim
testimony, offered publicly to the commissioners and the nation as a
whole. The TRC heard more than 22,000 victim statements and held some
160 victims' hearings (including 1200 of the victims and their families),
which were widely publicized through extensive media coverage. 236 The
TRC thus provided a public forum for victims to share their experiences of
injustice and have the public acknowledge them officially. 2 3 7 With the
aim of placing the victims at the center of its work, the TRC adopted a new
repertoire of norms and practices by which to honor the dignity of former
victims of oppression. This repertoire included a commitment to allow survivors to fully tell their own story without interruption; the creation of an
informal, compassionate setting, marked by the presence of sympathetic
witnesses; the performance of acts and rituals of symbolic acknowledgement (such as the ritual of commissioners rising when victims entered to
give testimony); and the provision of assistance to victim-witnesses before
and after their testimony. 238 Moreover, victims had a right to confront
their perpetrators, thereby emphasizing the personal damage suffered at
23 9
their hands.
232. See TUTU, supra note 12, at 50-5 1; Dana Michael Hollywood, The Search for PostConflict Justice in Iraq: A Comparative Study of TransitionalJustice Mechanisms and Their
Applicability to Post-Saddam Iraq, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 59, 76 (2007).
233. See TUTU, supra note 12, at 21-24; Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the InternationalCriminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 481, 495 (2003).
234. See MINOW, supra note 1, at 53; TuTu, supra note 12, at 49-50; Marianne Guela,
Note, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an Alternative Means of
Addressing Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Society, 18 B.U. INT' L.J. 57, 64
(2000).
235. See Guela, supra note 234, at 66.
236. Erin Daly, Reparationsin South Africa: A CautionaryTale, 33 U. MEM. L. Rev. 367,
374 (2003); Suzanne Daley, South African Panel's Report Arrives in Swirl of Bitterness,
N.Y.

TIMES,

Oct. 30, 1998, at Al.

237. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 47, 55 (1997).
238. See MINOW, supra note 1, at 60-61, 71-72.
239. See Rachel King, Restorative Justice: How Law Schools Can Help Heal Their Communities, 34 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1285, 1292 (2007).
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It remains to be seen how these activities relate to the idea of recognition as conceived of here. The TRC process, with its victim-centered public
hearings, certainly represents a promising effort to publicly acknowledge
the victims' moral injuries and painful stories-an effort to do justice to the
public experience of those whose very being had been so deeply violated. 240 In this sense, the value of the process lies precisely in its capacity
to give recognition to the victims and their pain, while also affirming a
position of collective solidarity with them. 24 1 The kind of public recognition involved here constitutes what we might term "symbolic action;" it
marks, symbolically, a break with the past and the establishment of a new
moral framework in which victims can receive validation of their humanity
and acknowledgement of the utter wrongness of its violation. 24 2 True, this
is a purely symbolic function, but it is an essential one nonetheless. As we
saw, the trauma of humiliation can constitute a serious injury, sometimes
on par with physical cruelty-and if this is so, then we should make it a
central concern of our reflections on transitional justice.
The TRC, then, embodied a public commitment to recognizing the
moral agency of those previously excluded, by encouraging victims to tell
their stories to someone who listened seriously and validated them with
official acknowledgement. 243 This is a form of recognition that, symbolically, seeks to reverse the imposition of victimhood and to re-equilibrate
the perceived power between perpetrator and victim. 24 4 In this connec-

tion, the gathering of testimony from survivors, including forgotten survi2 45
vors in forgotten places, had a central significance in the TRC process.
Crucial, here, was an effort to "render vivid and palpable the human faces
of suffering, and survival"-to enable individual victims to articulate the
24 6
lived, emotional meanings of their traumatic experiences.
These features of the TRC-especially the focus on victims and their
"narrative truths"-can be related in a very direct way to the model of recognition presented in this article. As noted, the point of the TRC endeavor
consists precisely of giving voice to the survivors by providing them with a
2 47
public forum to bring their experiences of injustice out into the open.
From this perspective, the difference between trials and truth commissions
appears to be only one of degree and emphasis rather than in kind.
Although the TRC may have a particular merit in emphasizing the
irreducibly subjective and emotive dimension of the experience of being
See Blumenson, supra note 210, at 865-66.
See id.
For an illuminating discussion of the role of symbolic action in marking a new
order, see Rajeev Bhargava, Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies, in TRUTH V.
JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 5, at 45, 57.
243. See Blumenson, supra note 210, at 866.
244. SeeJaime Malamud Goti, Equality, Punishment, and Self-Respect, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 497, 497-99 (2002).
245. See BalancingJustice, supra note 201, at 331.
246. MINOW, supra note 1, at 84.
247. See Raquel Aldana, A Victim-Centered Reflection on Truth Commissions and Prosecutions as a Response to Mass Atrocities, 5 J. HUMi. RTS. 107, 108 (2006).
240.
241.
242.
moral
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victimized, trials seem better suited to at least partially balance moral
accounts and give forceful expression to the community's opprobrium. 2 48
But, beyond these differences, both institutions provide potentially powerful ways of bringing recognition to the experiences of survivors of atrocity
and to their families. Fundamentally, they share an effort to acknowledge
and condemn horrors and can, therefore, have distinctive and mutually
complementary roles in shaping a discourse of recognition after atrocity.
Accordingly, one should not be too quick to accept the either/or simplification of "truth v. justice.

24 9

It remains an open question, however, whether a truth commission
like the South African TRC creates a level of accountability appropriate to
victims and their need for recognition. Do such institutions provide a suitable framework for calling those who committed abuses to explain? If, as
noted earlier, recognition is closely tied with a process of bringing offenders to confront the nature of their actions, then the issue is a crucial one.
So how much accountability was there in the TRC process? Certainly, the
South African truth commission represents an innovative effort to combine
individual grants for amnesty with mechanisms of truth-seeking and
accountability. 25 0 Unlike self-amnesties, which are often enacted by outgoing regimes to wipe out the offenses entirely, the amnesty process
employed by the TRC was not a blanket grant or expression of unconditional impunity. 2 5 1 Rather, it made amnesty-the exemption from criminal and civil liability-conditional on full disclosure of the offenders'
crimes. 25 2 In this process, amnesty was only available to individuals who
personally applied for it and who testified fully about the facts of misdeeds
that could fairly be characterized as serving political ends. 25 3 Thus, those
seeking amnesty were required to identify themselves individually and to
give detailed information relating to specific human rights violations. In
248. Cf. MINOW, supra note 1, at 58 ("Prosecution may be essential as well for the
healing of social wounds caused by serious violations, on the theory that a society cannot forgive what it cannot punish.").
249. See id. at 87-90.
250. See HAYNER, supra note 124, at 98-99; Sam Garkawe, The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission: A Suitable Model to Enhance the Role and Rights of the Victims
of Gross Violations of Human Rights?, 27 MELB. U. L. REv. 334, 353 (2003).
251. In July 1995, the South African Parliament passed the Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, which linked the granting of amnesty to a
truth seeking process. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995
s. 3(1)(h) [hereinafter Reconciliation Act], available at http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/legal/
act9534.htm.
252. South Africa's Interim Constitution, which applied from 1994 to 1997, stated in
its "postamble" that "amnesty shall be granted in respect to acts, omissions and offenses
associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the
past." S.AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993 ch. 16, available at http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/
sf10000_.html. Only later, under the Reconciliation Act, was the granting of amnesty
linked with the creation of a national truth commission empowered to grant amnesty "to
persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with
a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts." Reconciliation Act, pmbl.
253. The Reconciliation Act gave the Committee on Amnesty [CA] the power to grant
individualized amnesty to those who made "a full disclosure" of their past crimes and
showed the crimes to be "politically motivated." See id. ss. 20(1)(b); 20(1)(c).
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addition, many amnesty applicants had to testify in public, under close
questioning of the Amnesty Committee members and, in most instances,
the victims and their families.

2 54

Therefore, we may say that appearing before the TRC was somehow
burdensome or even painful for the applicants. The experience of making
detailed disclosures of the most brutal and horrific crimes in the glare of
nationwide publicity is one that few perpetrators likely wanted to
endure. 2 55 In this sense, we may think of the TRC process as a "disruption
of the freedom to pursue the satisfaction of one's desires." 25 6 Some have
also argued that the process of seeking amnesty resulted in forms of communal and private shaming, turning the former perpetrators into "new victims"-shunned by spouses, families, and friends. 25 7 More importantly,
the truth commission mobilized public opprobrium and demonstrated solidarity with the victims by reasserting the moral baseline to define the community's responsibilities and values. 258 In this light, the TRC endeavor can
be qualified as a process of punitive communication, intended to be painful
or burdensome not for its own sake but to convey a moral message-a message aimed at expressing the community's refusal to tolerate the bad example established by the crime.
The argument up to this point is that the South African amnesty process furthered some form of accountability, at least in a "weak" sense. The
more difficult issue, however, is whether the degree of accountability
achieved was enough to express a suitably weighty and forceful kind of
recognition. After all, the trade of truth for amnesty produced exemption
from punishment and civil liability, letting torturers and state-sponsored
killers get off "scot-free. ' 259 Perhaps the greatest moral objection placed on
amnesties lies in the suspicion that the victims' need for recognition is sacrificed-at least partially-for the sake of promoting other social goods
such as social unity or reconciliation. If there is no punishment for the
most egregious crimes, does society fail to fully respect the victims-particularly their sense of dignity and self-respect? Truth-telling, however crucial, may simply be insufficient. 2 60 Some harms, it seems, go so deep that
something more is owed to the victim-something that will recognize and
254. Section 19(4) of the Reconciliation Act empowered the CA to require applicants
to attend a public hearing. See id. s. 19(4).
255. See Balancing Justice, supra note 201, at 328.
256. Id. at 327 (quoting Jean Hampton).
257. See Dumisa B. Ntsebeza, The Uses of Truth Commissions: Lessons for the World, in
TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS, supra note 5, at 158, 164. This

is not the place to discuss in detail the argument that the TRC process resulted in public
and private shaming. Still, it is important to note that the insistence on informal sanctions of ostracism, disapproval, and disadvantage seems at odds with the ideal of the
rule of law-as opposed to private vengeance and vigilante justice-and sits uncomfortably with the TRC's discourse of forgiveness and reconciliation.
258. See TUTU, supra note 12, at 30-32.
259. When granted, amnesty meant not only that that the applicants could not be
prosecuted for their crimes, but also that they were legally freed from the threat of a civil
suits for damages. See Reconciliation Act, ss. 20(7)-(9).
260. See Aldana, supra note 247, at 297.
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address the seriousness of the wrong that he or she suffered. 26 1 To think
that the torturer or mass murderer could simply testify and then return to
normal life would minimize and trivialize the victim's trauma and loss of
trust in moral social order. 26 2 What we owe the victim, we may argue, is
truthful testimony plus some further and separate measures-measures
that exclude the offender from participation in the ordinary life of the community (e.g., imprisonment) or that are burdensome in other ways (e.g.,
restitution, fines, compulsory community services), independently of their
censorial meaning.
This argument suggests that we should pursue punishment not primarily in search of deterrence or moral improvement, but rather as a way of
validating and vindicating the victim of wrongdoing. 263 The purpose of
punishment, so understood, is to correct the perpetrator's implied message
that it is fine for his victim to be treated in this way. 26 4 After wrongdoing,
the truth of the victim's value must be publicly reasserted, and punishment
is an especially powerful way of communicating that reassertion. In the
absence of punitive actions, the response to crime risks appearing superficial or meaningless. 2 65 This is what Jaime Malamud Goti has in mind
when he writes: "[olnly public admission by authoritative institutions that
we were wronged will legitimize us in our own eyes, and punishment of the
violators of our rights is the clearest and strongest statement to that
effect." 26 6 From this perspective, closing down the pursuit of justice
through criminal and civil action seems a very high price to ask victims to
pay. Consequently, South Africa's truth commission, like any other process that sacrifices the rights of victims to receive their due, carries a heavy
moral burden. 26 7 As Raquel Aldana remarks, the trade of truth for
261. See DUFF, supra note 183, at 94-96.
262. See NAGEL, supra note 163, at 67-68.
263. Clearly, this point raises the question of whether, and how, punishment can be
morally justified. These are deep waters into which this article will delve no further
except to suggest that an alternative conception of retributivism-distinct from hard-line
versions of the lex talionis-may provide a plausible justification for punishing state
criminals. This version of retributivism makes the interests and needs of victims its
central concern, while at the same time focusing on moral communication. By this
account, punishment should be a communicative enterprise that seeks to send a moral
message to the offender and society-at-large-for example, the message that it is not
alright to kill or rape. Dreadful forms of punishment-like torturing torturers or killing
killers-are, then, unjustifiable because they are not conducive to moral reasoning. See,
e.g., M. Margaret Falls, Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons, 6 LAw & PHIL.
25, 50 (1987) (declaring that "the moral accountability theory demonstrates ... that
torturing torturers and killing killers is poor retributive justice"). Moreover, the justification of punishment should focus on the victim and her dignity rather than on the perpetrator breaching the law; it should be directed at reaffirming the victim's worth and lost
self-respect. For such an argument, see Goti, supra note 244, at 497.
264. See Goti, supra note 244, at 503-04.
265. See id. at 505.
266. Id. at 504.
267. See Aldana, supra note 247, at 108. For a forceful critique of how the victims'
and their relatives' resentment and resistance to forgiveness were treated in the South
African context, see THOMAS BRUDHOLM, RESENTMENT'S VIRTUE: JEAN AMERY AND THE
REFUSAL To FORGIVE 34 (2008).
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amnesty is likely to undermine "the condemnatory message that states
must send to perpetrators and the public about the nature of the crimes,
268
thereby disparaging the victims' plight."
Given the above analysis, one thing seems clear: both trials and truth
commissions can afford an institutional framework for giving public recognition to the undeserved suffering of individual victims. In this respect,
the difference between trials and commissions appears to be one in intensity and degree, not in kind, but the distinction becomes sharper if we consider the communicative or expressive function of punishment. Truth
commissions, on the one hand, may be better suited than trials for granting
victims the potentially affirming experience of being heard and
believed. 2 69 Trials, on the other hand, appear to be superior to truth commissions for their potential in correcting imbalances, drawing a moral bottom line, and thereby conveying that individuals and their pain do
matter. 270 Yet, both responses to wrongdoing are not counters but partners to recognition, and as such they are compatible and to some extent
overlapping approaches. Exclusionary approaches must therefore be
avoided.
IV.

Responding to Collective Evil

So far, this article has carved out the meaning of and space for recognition as a public response to individual crimes. In doing so, a central
assumption has been that the legitimacy of a government depends, in part,
on its capacity to protect its citizens against harm. As previously discussed, one way to live up to this ideal of a responsible government is to
provide a forum within which wrongs are publicly recognized and transgressors held accountable. 27 1 Matters become more complicated, however,
when a government resorts to, condones, or permits a large-scale violation
of its own citizens' rights to life and liberty. Most obviously, such episodes
of mass violence, orchestrated by the central state in a widespread and
organized fashion, indicate a fundamental failure on the part of state actors
to protect the civil interests of the citizenry. This failure raises the difficult
and deep issue of collective responsibility, an issue central to the topic of
transitional justice. Here, the state is not, so to speak, the "victim" of a
public injury but the victimizer. What is required, in such cases, is a form
of morality applicable not only to interpersonal behavior, but also to the
acts of political communities or groups. Accordingly, I shall now examine
268. Aldana, supra note 247, at 108.
269. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Justice and the Experience of Injustice, in
MINOW, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND REPAIR,

MARTHA

77, 94-95 (Nancy

L. Rosenblum ed., 2002).
270. See Charles S. Maier, Doing History, Doing Justice: The Narrativeof the Historian
and of the Truth Commission, in

TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS,

supra note 5, at 261, 269 (arguing that "only punishment and retribution seem available
to at least partially balance moral accounts").
271. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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whether and how the idea of recognition might be applied to the wrongful
actions of collectives.
The significance of this analysis emerges more clearly if we consider
the distinctive nature of collective evil and its potential impact on individual victims. Let me begin by emphasizing an essential element of collective, or group-based, wrongdoing-its public character. In instances of
"ordinary," individualized wrongdoing, a private person commits actions
forbidden by the law, and the public purpose of legally authorized punishment is to reaffirm the existence of legal order and make clear that the act
is unacceptable to the society. Collective wrongdoing is different. If an
entire community or group-such as a state or government-plans, permits, or condones acts that are terribly unjust or humiliating, the individual victim is made to look inferior or wanting in the eyes of the public: she
is publicly told that her life simply does not matter, that her presence
counts for nothing in the society's scheme of things. 27 2 The more overt
form of this is political exclusion. To be denied a voice or refused an ear in
public policy matters is to be rejected from social life. It means that one is
expelled from the class of full members of the community-the victim is
rendered voiceless or simply invisible within the public space. As Rajeev
Bhargava helpfully suggests, we might view this phenomenon as "a political
evil, which creates political victims.

' 2 73

He explains its implications as

follows:
A person who is robbed on a highway or systematically exploited on agricultural land or in a factory is a victim, but not a political victim. Political
victims are those who are threatened, coerced, or killed because of their
attempt to define and shape the character of their own society, and to determine the course of what it might become in the future. When political victims suffer violence, they are not merely harmed physically, however. The
act of violence transmits an unambiguous, unequivocal message, that their
views on the common good-on matters of public significance-do not

count, that their side of the argument has no worth and will not be heard,
that they will not be recognized as participants in any debate, and, finally,
that to negotiate, or even to reach a compromise with them, is 2worthless.
In
74
effect, it signals their disappearance from the public domain.

These considerations point to the inherently collective, indeed political, dimension of the crimes under consideration. Characteristically, episodes of massive evils, such as massacres and genocide, are rooted in
ideology-in some collective conviction, however misguided-about how a
society should be shaped or transformed. A purely individual-based
approach, focused exclusively on the personal responsibility of individual
agents, cannot tell the complex connections among people that make widespread collective violence possible. Rather, it is necessary to think in terms
of policies and institutions so as to contextualize the experiences of those
who have been brutalized in the larger "system." The relevant point is that
272. See

HONNETH, supra note 35, at 131-39.
273. Bhargava, supra note 242, at 47.
274. Id.
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collective wrongdoing, as a social and political fact, represents more than
just an aggregation of violent acts. It symbolizes a society's sheer lack of
respect and contempt for some individuals or groups of individuals. Consider a policeman or military official whose "job" consists of abducting,
torturing, and killing regime opponents as a means of political repression.
The evil thus wrought is not the result of "illegal" actions of some rogue
private agent, but rather is the product of policies enacted by the government itself. There is a sense, here, that society as a whole is complicit in
the crime. One might say that this collective nature of torture and other
abuses compounds the pain of these experiences with the approval of the
wider political community.
A.

Collective Responsibility

It seems, then, that there is a need for collective shifts in our thinking
about recognition and its role in transitional justice. If, as noted, acts of
widespread violence tend to be political in nature, then we may speak of an
institution or collective as recognizing past wrongs. The idea, however, of
some sort of corporate recognition raises fundamental philosophical
issues. If groups are to recognize their wrongdoings, there must some
sense in which groups may act and be held responsible for their wrongful
actions. But saying that groups as such can intentionally "do" things and
hence be blameworthy seems a peculiar way of describing human action.
Strictly speaking, only flesh-and-blood individuals "act," and it is difficult
to see how the idea of moral agency-and hence responsibility-could be
applied to groups as such. After all, only human beings can think about
reasons to do something or do otherwise and translate those reasons into
choices and then into actions. Yet, this individualistic perspective fails to
accord with the fact that we frequently blame corporations, governments,
and groups-be it Shell International, the World Bank, the U.S. Government, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), or even the Russian Mafia-for
their actions. One can find a recent expression of this moral practice in
former President Bill Clinton's remarks in acceptance of the 1996 Human
Radiation Final Report, in which he suggested that the U.S. government
has a moral responsibility "to keep its word, to tell the truth, and to do the
right thing. '27 5 The important claim here is that in practice we are willing
to regard a government or state as a kind of moral being and hence blameworthy. This claim points to the fundamental question: How can we make
sense of the idea that groups are responsible for their actions?
Larry May has vividly endorsed the idea that groups such as corporations and governments are moral agents and, hence, responsible for their
actions. 2 76 Taking an example from Jean Paul Sartre, he suggests that even
an unorganized mob-for instance, the mob storming the Bastille during
275. P. E.

DIGESER,

POLITICAL FORGIVENESS 146 (2001) (quoting President William J.

Clinton, Acceptance of the Human Radiation Final Report (Oct. 3, 1996)).
276. LARRY

MAY,

THE MORALITY OF GROUPS (1987).

May's account of collective responsibility, see FORGIVENESS
at 87.

For interesting comments on
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the French Revolution-can be said to act collectively, because of common
interests or a sense of solidarity. 2 77 Here, the relevant actions-storming
buildings, overcoming officials, freeing prisoners and so on-are performed by individuals standing in relationship to each other. 278 In virtue

of those relationships, their actions can be said to characterize the group as
a whole. 2 79 No individual could perform these actions alone, just as singing complex choral works (J.S. Bach's cantatas, for instance) is something
that an individual could not do alone. 280 There is a sense, then, in which
such collective actions are distinct from those of unrelated individuals and
therefore attributable to a larger group. 28 1 This point becomes even more
salient in situations in which there is a relatively clear decision-procedure
and an identifiable, institutionally established set of purposes. In such
cases, one might find plausible arguments to the effect that corporate entities are somehow capable of acting on reasons. Given its internal organization and decision structure, an entity might be said to have corporate
interests and goals that stand independent of the personal intentions of its
individual members. It is with this in mind that Peter French speaks of
certain kinds of groups as "intentional actors in their own right, and...
thereby full-fledged moral persons. '28 2 According to French, there is such
a thing as "corporate intentionality" which constitutes the moral basis for
2 83
holding groups responsible for what is done or not done.
This article shall not discuss these important and complex issues but
will only suggest that French's central argument about moral agency and
corporate bodies may provide us with a valuable framework for addressing
the fundamental philosophical issues at hand. This is especially true of
French's notion of conglomerates as distinct from aggregates and individuals. Conglomerations, by French's account, possess an internal decision
structure that enables them not only to arrive at decisions, but also to
establish the basic policies and goals of an institution. 284 As suggested
above, such corporations can be described as acting on reasons which, for
French, is the requisite characteristic of moral agency. A conglomerate, so
'28 5
defined, is not simply an aggregate or "merely a collection of people.
French's central claim is precisely that a conglomerate can itself act without all of the members acting-the conglomerate itself can be blamed for
an action without necessarily blaming the individual members of the
277. See MAY, supra note 276, at 66 (arguing that solidarity and decision practices/
procedures are each necessary and together sufficient conditions for group agency).
278. See id. at 37.
279. See id.
280. The example of a choir is Govier's. See FORGIVENESS AND REVENGE, supra note
200, at 87.
281. See id. at 88 (arguing that "[tihere are both distributive and collective ways of
making sense of attributions of various qualities to groups").
282. See

PETER

A.

FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

47 (1984) [here-

inafter FRENCH COLLECTIVE]. For a critical discussion of French's account of corporate
responsibility, see DIGESER, supra note 275, at 147-58.
283. See FRENCH COLLECTIVE, supra note 282, at 44.
284. See id. at 13-14.
285. See id. at 5.
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group. 28 6 In addition, what French calls a conglomerate is not an individual; it does not have a mind, a personality, a conscience, or feelings, in any
way a human being does. Therefore, French's conglomerate is far from the
metaphysical weirdness of concepts such as a group mind or
consciousness.
The assertion that agency, moral responsibility, and acting for a reason are linked together seems plausible-it accords with a shared belief that
responsibility involves an obligation to justify or explain one's actions,
especially if what one is doing is wrong or harmful. More important,
French's discussion of conglomerates helps us make sense of the notion of
how groups may act on reasons. Beyond that, it may be relevant to assessing and identifying levels of collective responsibility arising from major
social and political evils. Crucially, the idea of a government or state as a
conglomerate is consistent with and translatable into what Karl Jaspers
famously called "political responsibility"-a kind of communal responsibility without individual blame, deriving chiefly from an individual's citizenship or nationality. 28 7 Arguably, this sort of vicarious responsibility is the
price we pay for belonging to a conglomerate, such as a state or nation,
irrespective of the blame, if any, attaching to us as individual members.
We pay that price, Hannah Arendt suggests, "for the fact that we live our
lives not by ourselves but among our fellow men, and that the faculty of
action, which, after all, is the political faculty par excellence, can be actualized only in one of the many and manifold forms of human
community. "288
All this suggests that we can think of collective entities, such as states
or governments, as responsible for wrongdoing. One implication of this
analysis is that a corporation, to the extent that it is capable of action, can
make moral amends and somehow rectify the wrongs done. 28 9 In particular, it can grant appropriate recognition to those wronged through its practices, policies, and acts; acknowledging their loss and reaffirming their
intrinsic value as human beings and equal citizens. Undoubtedly, this idea
of collective recognition expresses a commitment to treat people with the
respect, the consideration, and the concern to which they are entitled by
virtue of what they have suffered. The question, then, is not whether the
victims of collective or institutional wrongs should be recognized in some
meaningful manner, but how.
B. Individual versus Collective Recognition?
Before pursuing this argument, however, this article lays out a rough
account of the relationship between individual and collective recognition.
Where a group countenanced or committed atrocities, an individual-based
model of recognition, as alluded to earlier, seems frustratingly inadequate
286. See PETER A. FRENCH, RESPONSIBILITY MATTERS 138 (1992).
287. See KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 78 (E. B. Ashton trans., 1947).
288. HANNAH ARENDT, RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT 158 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2003).
289. For a discussion of this idea, see LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT 249-53 (2005).
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to explain or discern the complex, intrinsically social ways in which such
wrongs are felt. In fact, the phenomenon of evil that is not spontaneous
and individual but organized and carried out top-down renders the focus
on select individuals and the premise of individual responsibility at best
problematic. This may prompt us to question, fundamentally, the appropriateness of using an "individualist" model of recognition to deal with
conflicts of the past in transitional societies. Is such an account simply
irrelevant to evaluating the central issues at hand? Should we assume, in
other words, that it has no utility here? I do not think so.
As discussed earlier, in evaluating the victims' experience of severe
injury or insult it is important to keep in mind the interpersonal character
of wrongdoing. Torture, rape, assault, and murder are, first and foremost,
wrongs planned and performed by individuals against other individuals,
however complex the circumstances. Victimizers and victims are, after all,
real flesh-and-blood human beings, not abstractions called "the state," "the
government," or whatever. 2 90 Crimes, in that sense, are rooted in perceptions of inter-personal meaning. As Thomas Nagel explains, to do horrible
things to someone puts you in a special-direct and personal-relation to
that particular human being.2 9 ' These things happen to him as a result of
what you do. Viewed through this lens, hostility or aggression is primarily
a relation between persons calling for, in Nagel's phrase, "a direct interpersonal response"-a response offered by the aggressor and presented
directly to the victim, rather than to the world at large. 29 2 This view points

to the moral significance of an interpersonal or one to one form of recognition, which may be integrated into a public framework in the ways
described above.
As conceived of here, the idea of a one to one form of recognition is
intimately linked to that of individual responsibility. Even in instances of
egregious systemic violence, human beings have moral choices-for
instance, about obedience to orders and passive versus active resistance.
An essential part of our moral lives is, precisely, that we can act on reasons
and translate those reasons into actions. I can do X or not do X. Addition290. This idea is central to models of restorative justice. See, e.g., Marc Forget, Crime
as Interpersonal Conflict: Reconciliation Between Victim and Offender, in DILEMMAS OF
RECONCILIATION, supra note 5, at 111, 112 (stating that crime is "harm caused to
people").
291. See NAGEL, supra note 163, at 67-68.
292. Id. at 67. This understanding of crime is associated with an "absolutist" view of
moral life, as opposed to utilitarian perspectives. See id. Moral absolutism, as conceived
of here, forbids doing certain things to others, such as the deliberate murder of an innocent person or torture, rather than bringing about certain results. See id. There are
limits to what can be done even in service of some end worth pursuing such as national
interest, freedom, democracy, and so on. See id. As Nagel argues, compellingly, these
moral limits to human action are related to the "possibility of justifying to the victim
what is being done to him." Id. at 67. From the perspective of the individual victim, any
justification for what one did seems irrelevant and meaningless unless it is offered to
him or her specifically, rather than to the world at large. See id. This perspective may
help us understand how certain requirements are absolute in the sense that they rule out
any calculation of what would justify their violation. For an illuminating analysis of
these issues, see id. at 53-74.
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ally, if I fail to do the right thing, I carry the moral burden of explaining
myself to those who suffer the consequences as well as to the moral community at large. 2 93 That is, this article contends, the essence of moral
responsibility. To be sure, assigning responsibility to specific individuals
is not always an easy task-especially in instances of ideologically thoughtout and collectively enacted evil. In modern or post-modern technological
society, political evil typically takes the form of an "abstract," at-long-range
and out-of-sight sort of violence, resulting from a complicated and impenetrable division of labor and from the concomitant fragmentation of responsibility among the participants. As Raul Hilberg memorably put it when
writing about the Holocaust, "[t]he perpetrator can now kill his victims
294
without touching them, without hearing them, without seeing them."
Perhaps, then, the technology and organization of modern wars and massacres is such as to make it impossible to hold individuals morally responsible. Perhaps the kind of destruction at work here is just too anonymous
and large-scale for that. This is what Zygmunt Bauman may have in mind
when he writes that "responsibility arises out of the proximity to the
other."'2 95 "Proximity," in his view, "means responsibility and proximity is
responsibility.

' 296

But is it?

In some ways this is a plausible description of how collectively organized perpetrators may feel about themselves and about what they do; but,
morally speaking, it is also an improbable one. 29 7 Consider, for example,
the case of a pilot dropping bombs on civilians in an enemy village. In this
case (as in others), proximity conditions regarding time, space, or relationship are obviously not satisfied. Still, it is difficult to believe that this man
can be excused of moral responsibility. It is clear, after all, that by bombing the village he deliberately kills and maims innocent people, actions that
impose a considerable moral responsibility on him. Even if others are also
to be blamed for what happens, that does not make his responsibility go
away. Other cases, however, are more difficult to assess. This is especially
true of organizational wrongs committed in a bureaucratic setting. Bureaucratic compartmentalization and division of labor are likely to lead to a
situation in which individuals lack the awareness of the role their acts play
293. Of course, the problem is much more complicated than that. In life, there may
be situations where one must choose between two courses of action, both of which it
would be wrong to undertake. The question of how such moral dilemmas can be faced
is one I shall not pursue here. Nor can I address the particular problem of "dirty
hands," which is of great relevance in the context of state-sponsored violence. For an
insightful discussion of that problem, see Michael Walzer, PoliticalAction: The Problem of
Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160 (1973).
294. See RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 1187 (1985). For a
discussion of the Holocaust as a starting point for moral theory, see VETLESEN, supra
note 25, at 14-51.
295. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, MODERNITY AND THE HOLOCAUST 184 (1989).
296. Id.
297. To be fair, however, we should note that Bauman's thesis refers to responsibility
in a psychological-empirical sense, inspired by Miligram's experiments. His concern,
therefore, is not with trying to elucidate the legal or philosophical meaning of responsibility. VETLESEN, supra note 25, at 23-27.
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in the larger corporate undertaking. In such cases, individuals may offer
the epistemological excuse that they "did not know." This problem of fragmented knowledge raises the complex and deep issue of establishing a
workable account of individual responsibility-an issue that will not be discussed further here; however, a helpful way of approaching the problem
may be through a conception of culpable ignorance. The right question,
2 98
then, is not "did they know?" but "should they have known?"
But this is not the end of the story. Given the inherently political
dimension of the abuses that demand our attention, a model of group recognition not only makes sense in theory, it also responds to many of the
practical exigencies of societies seeking to move on after collective violence.
An approach that deals with crime as a purely individual-phenomenon can
hardly capture the moral complexity of the process by which ordinary people come swept up in the "group-think" of orchestrated evil. 29 9 It cannot
tell the complex phenomena of mass atrocities carried out by collectively
organized and "deindividuated" perpetrators. Nor can it make sense of the
category of bystanders-those individuals who did not actively participate
in violence (and thus have no criminal liability), but also did not actively
intervene to stop horrors. It seems clear, then, that the inherently collective
nature of the crimes under consideration demands some kind of group
recognition for change to occur. For the reasons given above, however,
interpersonal accounts of recognition also have a role to play in contexts of
transitional justice. Both approaches are, therefore, complementary rather
than antagonistic. Again, one must avoid an all-or-nothing kind of
thinking.
C.

Towards a Conception of Collective Recognition

In considering what a conception of collective (or group-based) recognition would look like, it may be useful to draw on our discussion of the
negative moral concept previously referred to as "misrecognition." This
way of looking at the matter coheres with what is one of the central claims
of this article: that by giving attention to negative moral concepts, such as
humiliation and disrespect, we may gain a better understanding of the relevant positive values and dispositions. More specifically, it may be helpful
to start with some practices that appear to be institutionalmanifestations of
misrecognition-institutional in the sense that they refer to the misrecognition of a society's members by its institutions. As we saw earlier, one way
of approaching the concept under scrutiny here is through the phenomenon that Honneth describes as social invisibility-the humiliating experi298. For a valuable effort to extend the concept of culpable ignorance to the problem
of fragmented knowledge, see generally David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the
Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2348 (1992).

299. For insightful discussions of the nature of collective evil, see MARI A.
ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

DRUMBL,

202 (2007) (observing that mass atroc-

ity is "deeply collective in nature and, what is more, that its collective action surpasses
the aggregate of all individual action"); MAY, supra note 276, at 246-53 (discussing collective responsibility and collective remedies); VETLESEN, supra note 25, at 145-219
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ence of being refused a voice and being denied an ear that signals one's
disappearance from the public domain. 30 0 To make people socially invisible means, essentially, to treat them (institutionally) as though they have
no reality-as though they are not what they actually are (which, in Frankfurt's usage, is disrespectful). 3 0 1 This occurs, for instance, if an individual's experience of harm and injury is made to look "normal," little,
unimportant, or even banal. 30 2 There are many such ways of looking
"through" the victimized-some more clear-cut than others. But what
seems common to all these downgrading and exclusionary practices is the
sheer lack of genuine concern for individuals and their suffering.
In times of political transition, newly democratic regimes can mis30 3
recognize the victims of collective wrongdoing in more than one way.
Misrecognition is direct when a new regime has an official policy of trying
to cover up or deny past wrongs. It is indirect when the regime fails to
properly respond to or act in light of the humiliating subordination, rejection, or exclusion inherent in collectively perpetrated wrongs. This is obviously the case if a society and its institutions do nothing in response to the
harms suffered. Still, even if society does something in response, it may be
inadequate to the task of marking a collective recognition of those who
have been wronged. Where a new regime takes some concrete measures to
repair the injuries of the past, the adequacy of response will depend a good
deal on how the response is presented. Some measures of reparation-such
as offering money or resources-may be just and efficient, yet still insuffi30 4
cient as a response to the humiliating aspects of collective wrongdoing.
As we saw, symbolic devaluation is an essential part of what it means to be
socially silenced and removed from the public domain. Therefore, symbolic gestures, or rituals, are significant as ways of expressing a society's
very commitment to include the previously excluded and oppressed as
fully recognized members of the polity.
Although these considerations are rather vague, they provide an
entrance to a conception of collective recognition. Drawing on the practices of socially induced misrecognition described above, we can identify a
set of features that may be associated with the goal of giving public recognition to the victims of collective violence and, thereby, to their moral
worth and dignity as fellow citizens. Some of these features also play a role
in the interpersonal model of recognition sketched in Part III. This is especially true of what I have called the criteria of responsiveness and directness. As in the interpersonal case, collective recognition requires a proper
response to the wrongs done and should, in principle, be presented
300. See HONNETH, supra note 35, at 131-39; Invisibility, supra note 146, at 112.

301. See Frankfurt, supra note 142, at 12.
302. See MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 101-02.
303. See, e.g., Carlos H. Acufia & Catalina Smulovitz, Guarding the Guardians in
Argentina: Some Lessons About the Risks and Benefits of Empowering the Courts, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEw DEMOCRACIES, supra note 5, at 93, 94.
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But, of course, there are also impor-

tant structural differences that must be kept in mind. In contrast to
unmediated or mediated interpersonal relations of recognition in which
the analytical focus is upon interaction between particular wrongdoers and
their victims, the kind of discourse of recognition that concerns us shifts
the moral burden onto the political community by taking up the perspective of "collective" victims-individuals or groups within the society who
were (in effect and by design) persistently or systematically excluded from
the rights and benefits of the community. 30 6 It is worth noting, before
diving in, five distinctive features that give this form of recognition its particular timbre.
First, revealing the truth about the atrocities of prior regimes-establishing a publicly verifiable record of what occurred and why-is a prerequisite for the kind of collective recognition that this article envisages.
Through the construction of collectively shared knowledge regarding the
past, the seemingly private experiences of injustice are made "part of the
public cognitive scene."'30 7 As a response to collective wrongdoing, this
kind of remembering is primarily concerned with political violence as a
"macro-sociological" phenomenon, rather than with specific "micro" incidences of wrongdoing.
Second, a collective recognition, publicly uttered in response to
socially organized cruelty, can be performed successfully only by an individual (or several individuals) possessing the authority to speak on behalf
of the collectivity. That is to say, it is the speaker's status as an authorized
representative that makes his or her positions and statements official, binding, and collective. Without the appropriate authority, any response to
past wrongs amounts to no collective recognition at all because it lacks the
30 8
moral imprimatur of the group.
Third, granting recognition to political victims, in Bhargava's sense,
305. In most cases, collective recognition will take what might be called a many-to-one
form, consisting of a state or government offering recognition of individual victims and
the wrongs they have suffered. See TAvUCHIS, supra note 181, at 90-92. In some situations, however, it may be appropriate for a collective or institution to extend a measure
of official recognition to the victims as a group (many-to-many form). See id. at 98-101.
Take, for instance, the case of an official memorial dedicated to the victims of a nowdiscredited regime or "communal reparations" offered to specific groups and communities who have been seriously and unjustly excluded or disadvantaged in order to
strengthen their socioeconomic development. Id. at 48.
306. See DUFF, supra note 183, at 195; TAVUCHIS, supra note 181, at 69.
307.
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4 (1990) (quoting Thomas Nagel).
308. See TAvUCHIS, supra note 181, at 100-01. As a public representative, the spokesperson is speaking for the community and, consequently, his or her personal history is
not part of the process: he or she may or may not have been directly involved in the
harmful acts in question. See id. One might wonder, however, whether a spokesperson's personal involvement in past wrongs can place an important obstacle in the path
of collective recognition. In light of prior participation in evildoing, one's discourse of
recognition may appear questionable, dubious, or disqualified; depriving the discourse
of any moral force to which it lays claim.
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requires lending them a restored political and juridical standing. 30 9 This
involves, in particular, setting the record "straight" on prior false allegations of political criminality and removing the stigma of social defamation.
Fourth, collective recognition is relevant to the wider audience as
much as to the wronged persons. As a particular form of social intercourse, it speaks to a society-at-large-its institutional context and history-and entails public representation of the collectivity's moral position
in a broader social web. 310 Thus, the offering of collective recognition is
quintessentially a public event-one that puts things on "record" and cultivates a sense of shared collective interest.
Fifth, and more generally, we are dealing here with a form of moral
discourse that bespeaks a collective commitment to correcting past wrongs
and ensuring that similar acts will not be repeated in the future. In this
sense, it is a transformative project, expressly designed to advance significant changes in social and political behavior-changes that communicate a
due recognition of those who have suffered wrongs as fellow citizens. That
project requires, most obviously, a serious collective commitment to remedy the kinds of exclusion that previously denied some people the status of
full members of the polity. To be sure, promoting democratic consolidation and equitable socioeconomic development is an important part of that
societal restructuring which is needed to restore the victims' sense of reality and place in the polity.
D.

Actualizing the Purposes of Collective Recognition

The preceding considerations sharpen the inquiry somewhat but
remain fairly abstract. Thus, the ensuing critical question that arises is,
what practical measures would constitute appropriate recognition? As a
form of moral criticism of public policy, our account would be radically
incomplete if it were silent on the ways and means of putting it into practice. With this in mind, let us briefly consider some avenues for actualizing the core purposes of collective recognition.
1. Truth-Telling
To provide recognition of collective evildoing, a society must disclose
and publicly disseminate the facts so that the truth may be known and
made part of its history. 3 1 1 Most obviously, this task involves establishing
accurate documentation of who did what to whom and under whose
orders. More broadly, for group recognition to occur, a society should
aspire to encompass the story of the society or regime as a collective phenomenon, seeking to embed the perpetrators' crimes within the wider con309. See Bhargava, supra note 242, at 47; David A. Crocker, Reckoning With Past
Wrongs: A Normative Framework, in DILEMMAS OF RECONCILIATION, supra note 5, at 39,
47-51; see also GOVIER, supra note 22, at 48-49.
310. Cf. GOVIER, supra note 22, at 48; TAVUCHIS, supra note 181, at 71 (stating that in
the public sphere, sorrow "is overshadowed and subverted by the apparent compulsion
to generate unambiguous speech").
311. See GOVIER, supra note 22, at 44.
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text of political violence (supported or tolerated by the mass of citizens).
However, the aim of truth-telling, as a process of collective history-making,
is not simply to investigate the "hard facts" and correct a public record, but
to tell an "official story" that delegitimizes an earlier regime or set of societal practices. 3 12 To constitute such a story, the events need to be authoritatively established and officially recounted by the state, for this is the only
way for the society-at-large to show that it acknowledges that something
morally unacceptable has been committed by-or in the name of-the collective. This kind of acknowledgement, stamped with the state's imprimatur, can create a kind of joint understanding that groups or individuals
have been significantly wronged at the hands of the community and that
we-as members of that community and citizens of the state-are united in
caring about them. Thus, disclosure of truth may help to enhance consensus and solidarity in a deeply divided and traumatized society while, at the
same time, contributing to the process of social transformation.
This suggests that there is an "official story" to be told, one to be publicly exposed and acknowledged. The question then is, how do we construct an "official story," an authoritative "meta-narrative," of an evil past?
The state's establishing of historical truth can take many forms-from textbook revisions, parliamentary inquiries, newly opened government
archives to public commemoration in the form of monuments, museums,
art projects, and so on. While there are indeed various tools for the construction of new national histories, the most notable one is perhaps the socalled "truth commission." The truth commission is a temporary official
body charged with inquiring into widespread human rights abuses by a
prior regime or its opponents, typically completing its work with the submission of a "report"-a written and well-documented record of otherwise
disbelieved or forgotten events. 3 13 Far beyond simply gathering the facts, a
truth commission can cut through myths, lies, misplaced apologies, and
deliberate distortions of the historical record by revealing "a global truth of
the broad patterns of the events."'31 4 Additionally, if it is effective and
faithful to its task, the truth commission is likely to make "a major contribution in understanding how people and the country as a whole were
'31 5
affected, and what factors contributed to the violence.
Trials, by contrast, are-first and foremost-designed to investigate the
specific acts of accused perpetrators, rather than the greater patterns and
multiple sources of mass violence. 3 16 Because of this focus on particular
individuals and their conduct at a particular moment in time, trials seem at
best imperfect means to tell the complexity and depth of large-scale evil as
performed by a collective. Yet, the regularized formal procedures of crimi312. See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE LAW 273 (1997)

(arguing that the state "must tell a story that de-legitimates the prior regime, the claims
made by its leaders and by its contemporary apologists on their behalf').
313. See GOVIER, supra note 22, at 161, 207 (discussing truth commissions); see also
Crocker, supra note 309, at 46.
314. HAYNER, supra note 124, at 85.
315. Id.
316. See Crocker, supra note 309, at 46-47; Hope for Healing, supra note 132, at 239.
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nal law, or even civil litigation, can establish a measure of historical truth
through the collecting and recording of actions and the naming of perpetrators. 3 17 Beyond this, they may, as Lawrence Douglas has argued, succeed
as an exercise in "didactic legality" by teaching history and shaping collec3 18
tive memory.
Of course, the very idea of an "official," commissioned truth is deeply
offensive to those "postmodernist" theorists who deny the very possibility
of any single, integrated discourse about history and politics.

31 9

Trying to

"synthesize" an encompassing narrative from diverse sources or histories is
certainly a dangerous exercise. Written narratives may well degenerate
into simple efforts to control history and to privilege the significance of
some stories more than others. Yet, as historian Charles Maier contends, a
historical public can legitimately ask for a national history-a history that
"allows for contending voices, that reveals the aspirations of all actors, the
hitherto repressed and the hitherto privileged."'3 20 To be sure, such a history is always provisional and remains subject to amendment as new evidence arises, but it should, nonetheless, be authoritative in that it imposes
"what for broad (though not all) segments of opinion can be accepted as a
'321
plausible narrative.
2.

Apologies

Similar to Nicholas Tavuchis, we might refer to apology as a speech act
in which the speaker expresses sorrow and regret to seek forgiveness from
the person wronged. 3 22 On this understanding, a proper and successful
apology for wrongdoing requires acknowledgement and full acceptance of
responsibility by the wrongdoer. 3 23 But it involves more than this. The
heart of apology consists of a genuine display of sorrow and contrition for
the harm done and an implicit commitment to avoid such wrongs in the
future. Moreover, the kind of apology envisaged here provides, or purports
to provide, a reason for an emotional shift away from resentment in the
3 24
direction to forgiveness as a central element in the apologetic process.

All this suggests that the sincere expression of regret and remorse is essential to an authentic apology offered by one individual to another.
As conceived of here, apologies apply primarily to the realm of interpersonal relations. "[An authentic apology," writes Tavuchis, "cannot be
delegated, consigned, exacted, or assumed by the principals [sic], no less
outsiders, without totally altering its meaning and vitiating its moral
317. See

OSIEL,

supra note 312, at 271; see also Maier, supra note 270, at 270.

318. See generally

LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND

(2001) (discussing the trials of the Holocaust
as "dramas of didactic legality").
319. See Crocker, supra note 309, at 46 (asking how can there be one truth about the
past and how we should understand this in relation to diverse views about the truth).
320. Maier, supra note 270, at 274.
321. Id. at 275.
322. TAVUCHIS, supra note 181, at 23.
323. See id. at 18-19.
324. See id.

HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST
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force." 3 25 If the emotion of sorrow and remorse is the "engine" of apology,
then the intervention of third parties or collective actors seems somewhat
antithetical to the apologetic act (which, typically, calls for direct
exchanges between the offender and the offended). 326 All of this renders
problematic apologies by individuals acting as spokespersons for groups or
institutions. Not only does the apology in that case tend to be offered by
people who were not themselves involved in the commission of the offenses
or who have only remote connections with the perpetrators; 3 2 7 it is also
quintessentially public-rooted in, and ruled by, a dimension of publicity
that produces a discourse of "record."'32 8 In contrast to unmediated
human relationships, here we find a form of articulation that takes us into
a formal, official, and public discursive world in which, it would seem,
emotionality is ruled out and reduced to a remote, measured, or disembodied mode of speech.

3 29

If this is indeed so, does it preclude the effective articulation of collective apologies and regrets? After all, the lack, or relative lack of expression
of emotion in the institutional or collective case sits rather uneasily with an
account of apology whose "moving force and vital centre" is sorrow. 3 30 In
their recent paper, The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology, Trudy Govier and
Wilhelm Verwoerd suggest a way around this problem. 3 3 1 The authors
argue that it is by shifting from perpetrator-centered emotion to victim-centered acknowledgement that we gain a better understanding of what constitutes a collective or institutional apology. 33 2 What matters, in their view,
is not so much that the apology be expressed through the emotion of the
spokesperson(s) but that it "acknowledge wrongdoing and thereby also
acknowledge the human dignity and legitimate feelings of those
wronged. '33 3 This means that collective apologetic speech does not necessarily entail sincere expressions of sorrow and remorse and, except in pro
forma fashion, need not in order to realize its potential. 334 The point is
that a collective mea culpa, officially uttered in response to past evil legacies, can have a ritual or formalized character-intended or known to leave
the question of sincerity open-and still be meaningful in terms of publicly
acknowledging the nature and seriousness of the wrongs done. 33 5 It is,
arguably, this latter function that constitutes the discursive core-the vital
center-of collective apology.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 49.
See id.
Id. at 98.
See id. at 101.
See id. at 23.
See id.
See Trudy Govier & Wilhelm Verwoerd, The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology, 33J.
OF Soc. PHIL. 67 (2002).
332. See id. at 74.
333. Id.
334. See id.
335. See DUFF, supra note 183, at 94-95 (noting the moral worth of formal or ritual
apologies whose sincerity is unknown or doubtful).
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Reparations

After periods of massive and systematic violence, there is a sense that
"sorry is not enough"-that countries and other entities ought to make
amends for the most sordid aspects of their past and restore victims of
earlier wrongdoing. 3 36 What, then, can be done in reparation for such historical injustices? Ideally, we can hope to restore the original situation
prior to the wrongdoing (status quo ante culpum), as if the harm or wrong
had never occurred. 33 7 The good that was lost would then be regainedthe victim gets back the exact same thing which was taken, damaged,
threatened, or undermined, such as property, health, trust, good reputation, and the like. Other goods, however, such as human life, bodily integrity, self-respect, time, continuity, community, or identity cannot be
returned; nor can property if it has been destroyed or sold beyond recall.
All that is possible in such cases is some form of recompense that might

"make up" for the loss of what cannot be restored. 3 38 The loss is then
counterbalanced with something else that is equivalent in value. The payment of money, for instance, might play such a role in compensating victims or their descendants and successors, and offsetting their losses. Other
material or non-material benefits-such as insurance, scholarships, political rehabilitation, public acts of commemoration, letters of apology, proper
burials for the victims, affirmative actions, service packages (including
medical, educational, legal and housing assistance) etc.-might also be
effective in addressing both the wrong of the injustice and any unjust
losses resulting from them.
The underlying justification for such reparations is, essentially, justice: the victim who suffers a loss as a result of wrongdoing deserves just
compensation. 3 39 It follows, in particular, that compensatory reparations
should be in proportion to the harms experienced by the wronged parties,
or their descendants and successors. 3 40 But, quite apart from any attempt
to compensate past injuries, reparations can have what Joel Feinberg has
described, in another context, as "a certain expressive function"-they
might express a clear public recognition that injustice did happen, that it
should not have happened, and that it must not be forgotten. 3 4 1 The aim
of pecuniary compensation, then, is not only to pay victims for financial or
material losses, but also to provide symbolic expression of guilt and regret
336. See generally Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology,
THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR

in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH:

HUMAN

INJUSTICE

3-12 (Roy L.

Brooks ed., 1999).
337. See JOEL

FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY

76 (1970) ("Reparation can express sympathy, benevolence, and concern, but, in addition, it is always the acknowledgment of past wrong, a 'repayment of debt,' and hence,
like an apology, the redressing of moral balance or the restoring of the status quo ante
culpum.").
338. See R. A. Duff, Restorative Punishment and Punitive Restoration, in RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 82, 84-85; see also Brooks, supra note 336, at 8-9.
339. See Irwin Coter, The Holocaust, Thefticide, and Restitution: A Legal Perspective, 20
CAlRozo

L. REV. 601, 618 (1998).

340. See id.
341.

FEINBERG,

supra note 337, at 98.
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and to offer an unqualified and unambiguous apology to those who suffered the injustice. 3 42 Jeremy Waldron makes this point when he writes:
"Like the gift I buy for someone I have stood up, the payment is a method
343
of putting oneself out, or going out of one's way, to apologize."
There is, in this sense, an interwoven relationship between compensation and apology. Without some sort of monetary compensation, any
apology for serious wrongdoing risks seeming superficial, half-hearted, or
meaningless, and many individuals will be inclined not to take such apologies very seriously. There is, here, the sense that "talk is cheap." 344 At the

same time, compensation without any corresponding admission of wrongdoing is likely to be dismissed because it falls short of addressing the moral
indignation that victims may feel-and have reasons to feel-in response to
being wronged. If human suffering is beyond price, then "it's not about the
money. ' 34 5 The inappropriateness of putting value on losses becomes
especially pronounced in the context of mass atrocity. As Martha Minow
notes, "no market measures exist for the value of living an ordinary life,
without nightmares or survivor guilt." 3 4 6

Money cannot restore lives as

they existed before the horrors and humiliations experienced from massive, systematic instances of rape, torture, or murder. Even the suggestion
that monetary payments can seal the wounds, make victims whole, or
clean the slate seems offensive. That very suggestion fails to acknowledge
the enormity of what was done; as a statement of value, it trivializes the
harms inflicted on those who have been raped, maimed, or tortured by
their fellow citizens.

34 7

No monetary payment-or any other reparative measure for that matter-can ever undo the violence done or erase the victims' grievances.
Money cannot make up for the discomfort and degradation victims suffered at the hand of their tormentors. Moreover, commensurate material
compensation is rarely practical, especially when the wrongs committed
are of such magnitude that they defy computation and comprehension. 3 48
Nonetheless, one should not underestimate the symbolic impact of reparations. Even inadequate monetary payments can speak to the victims and
their experience of injustice by validating and showing respect to their narratives of suffering and loss. As efforts to "make up" to the injured for
what they have suffered, reparations can make a significant contribution in
recognizing the value and moral standing of the victims-as citizens, as
human beings, and as victims. 3 49 In the eyes of the victimized, this recog-

nition may be as important as, or more important than, actual material
gains. A telling example is the refusal of the Korean "comfort women" to
342.
343.
344.
22-23
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

See id.
Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 7 (1992).
See John Torpey, Introduction: Politics and the Past, in POLITICS AND THE
(John Torpey ed., 2003).
See id. at 23.
MINOW, supra note 1, at 104.
See id.
See GOVIER, supra note 22, at 179-80.
See id. (referring to the symbolic dimension of reparations).
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accept reparations from Japan's private fund. "To them," explains Elazar
Barkan, Japan's limited willingness to admit its guilt "depreciated the economic value of the compensation and made it valueless." 350 This example
underscores the significance of what we might call reparatorysymbolism as
a necessary additional step toward acknowledging wrongdoing, breaking
with an atrocity and its legacy, and thus restoring the dignity of the victims
as full-fledged, equal citizens.
4.

Positive Symbolism

Collective evildoing usually comes in the form of what shall be
referred to here as "negative symbolism": maligning, disparaging, or
ridiculing some social actors by means of the authoritative representational
and communicative practices of a society. This phenomenon occurs when
a society, through its institutions, establishes and promotes symbolsincluding icons, images, names, narratives, and events-that are implicitly
or explicitly directed against some of its members. This kind of mistreatment, rooted in symbolic perceptions, can take (and has taken) many
forms-ranging from demeaning stereotypical depictions in public discourse, to harassment and disparagement in all spheres of everyday life.
Yet, what seems common to all of them is the fact that the targeted individuals are turned into-in Margalit's words-"second class-citizens on a symbolic level," which is profoundly humiliating and incompatible with the
351
very idea of a decent society.
The "remedy," so to speak, for this form of negative symbolism is symbolic restructuring of some sort. This restructuring involves, quintessentially, transforming the societal patterns of representation in ways that
mark the point of revaluing previously despised and maligned individuals
or groups. The task, then, is to mobilize a society's symbolic resources to
recognize and positively valorize those who were subject to pervasive devaluation and disparagement. From this perspective, positive symbolism-as
a matter of recreating the criminal past through symbols of public ritualsis a central feature of collective recognition. 35 2 Public culture-including
monuments, reanimated sites and spaces, museum narratives, contemporary fine art, plays, poems, theatricals, documentaries, and so on-can play
a crucial role in shaping as well as reflecting symbolic change. For example, memorial culture in South Africa since apartheid is instructive of the
significance placed on monuments and public artworks as means of rendering new meaning to memories of atrocities. The transformation of Robben Island into an icon of resistance and liberation; the Museum in Cape
Town's Six District, a place where the diversity of communities was rich
350.

ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL

INJUSTICES 352 (2000).

351. MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 158.

352. My account has something in common with Nancy Fraser's conception of symbolic change as a remedy for symbolic injustice, rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication.

See NANCY

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION

FRASER, JUSTICE

INTERRUPTUS:

11, 14-16 (2002).
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before the forced removals; the apartheid museum outside Johannesburg;
the Hector Pieterson memorial in Soweto; the "Women's Goal" which forms
part of the larger "Constitutional Hill" project; all of these are forms of
public spectacle that enable the symbolic construction and reinterpretation
of history as a matter of collective recognition. 3 53 Another strategy for
reinterpreting the past through symbolic action is the "reconfiguring" of
public space by raising or tearing down particular statues in particular
places and by renaming streets and buildings. 3 54 In addition, educationthrough textbooks, community programs, research projects, exhibitions for
adults and children, fellowships, and so on-offers means of embodying
new histories in public spheres.
Beyond that, symbols of public or collective ritual are also important
at an institutional level. A central feature of societal-level atrocities is the
loss of trust in the state and its institutions. The mobilization of adequate
official symbols-such as emblems, remembrance days, formal addresses
to the parliament, political speeches, gestures by political figures etc.-may
help to overcome feelings of distrust and to regain confidence in the
state.3 55 But positive symbolism, as understood here, involves more than
that. It requires, ideally, that a society's governing laws and practices
expressing
speak to the victims in a language that they can understand3 as
56
real respect for them and their righteous sense of injustice.
It is worth noting here the potential tension between positive symbolism and bureaucracy. Although some amount of bureaucracy may be inevitable in the smooth running of public institutions, and especially so in
transitional settings, there is an inherent risk of turning the victims of past
wrongs into "numbers," "application forms," or something of that nature
which, as Margalit reminds us, is humiliating in its very essence. 3 57 Offering money or services in a bureaucratic (mechanistic) manner may be just
and efficient, yet can still be deeply humiliating. 3 58 This demonstrates the
significance of symbolic and communicative nuances (such as wording,
tone, demeanor, physical posture, etc.) as sensitive indicators of changing
attitudes and perceptions. To put it another way, what matters is not only
the "language" used to address the victims but also the "tones" and
"accents" in which the language is spoken.
Although once could elaborate on many other aspects-including the
role of lustrations and institutional reforms as avenues for providing collec353. For an informative discussion of the memorial culture in South Africa since

apartheid,

see ANNIE E. COOMBES, HISTORY AFTER APARTHEID: VISUAL CULTURE AND PUBLIC
(2003).

MEMORY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA
354.

See KATHERINE VERDERY, THE POLITICAL LIVES OF DEAD BODIES: REBURIAL AND POST-

SOCIALIST CHANGE 39-40 (1999) (discussing the idea of "reconfiguring" space and time).

355. See Rosenblum, supra note 269, at 99 (discussing efforts to produce a national
narrative intended to shape public consciousness).
356. See DUFF, supra note 183, at 188-93 (emphasizing the role of law as a communicative enterprise).
357. See MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 212-21 (discussing the humiliating aspects of
bureaucracy).
358. See id.
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tive recognition-this abbreviated inventory must be brought to a close.
However, our account. does not end here. There is a further issue still
before us-that of understanding conflicts between the proposed model of
recognition and other moral claims or requirements.
In Lieu of a Conclusion: Recognition and Moral Conflict
This article has presented a model of recognition whose core notion is
that of giving voice to victims of large-scale evil, of addressing not only the
demand for formal, rule-bound justice but also the sense of injustice. A
fuller treatment of the subject, which this article cannot offer, would give a
much richer account of how such recognition can be achieved in the aftermath of mass atrocity. In particular, it would discuss the potential role of
35 9
international institutions in providing recognition of the pain of victims.
Further, it would address troubling issues of whether and to what extent
present institutions can properly recognize wrongs of a distant past. Further still, it would clear some space for culturally rooted responses (such as
the South African concept of ubuntu3 60 or Rwanda's Gacaca Courts 36 1) as
tools for catalyzing social change and shaping discourses of recognition.
However, in spite of the limitations of this article, it has hopefully painted a
picture of recognition and its moral significance for victims that the
thoughtful reader will find persuasive, or at least worthy of critical
engagement.
At this stage, it would be very tempting, and perhaps comforting, to
end our account on an overly optimistic note, suggesting that there is a
point of view-recognition-from which we are amenable to the discovery
of the "right answers" to the problems of transitional justice. But, it would
also be misleadingly simplistic. Given the way the world is, it seems naive
to suppose that there is a clear-cut solution to every moral problem we face
in our personal and public lives. Our moral experience bears witness to
the fact that moral claims or requirements can conflict and so draw us in
irreconcilable ways; that the world we inhabit can confront us with situations in which there is no way of avoiding moral loss, of unsettling the
conflict. But, as Isaiah Berlin has compellingly argued,
it is better to face this intellectually uncomfortable fact than to ignore it, or

automatically attribute it to some deficiency on our part which could be
eliminated by an increase in skill or knowledge; or, what is worse still, suppress one of the competing values altogether3 6by
pretending that it is identical
2

with its rival-and so end by distorting

it.

This is particularly true with regard to the complex and deep issues of

transitional justice. In times of radical political change, societies face a
359. For insightful and critical discussions of the role of international war tribunals
in ensuring that victims are treated with dignity, see STOVER, supra note 219.
360. See TUTU, supra note 12, at 31.
361. See DRUMBL, supra note 299, at 12.
362. Steven Lukes, Making Sense of Moral Conflict, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE
128, 134 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (quoting Isaiah Berlin).
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plurality of conflicting ends, goals, interests, or (more vaguely still) "values"-including justice, truth, national unity, peace, the common good, or
the interests of democracy. This is not to suggest, however, that the moral
concerns of transitional justice can be reduced to something like a common denominator called "recognition" (however broadly defined). Rather,
we should think of transitional justice in terms of conflicts-conflicts
between two or more apparently incommensurable types of values-and
attempts to achieve what Jonathan Allen has called "principled compromises." 3 63 The key idea here, is that
we should first ascertain whether every aspect of a value is threatened in a
conflict and whether the values in question may be related in some way. If
they are, or if aspects of both values may continue to be respected despite the
conflict, then it may be the case that a principled compromise, rather than an
unprincipled compromise, or the sacrifice of one value to another is
3 64
possible.

On this assumption, we should avoid treating every case of conflict
between values as an all-or nothing affair-involving the sacrifice of one
value for another-and think about ways in which a genuine balance
between the values at stake can be achieved.
Accordingly, this article assumes that recognition, as presented here,
is not the only moral consideration that should guide societal responses to
mass atrocity. Despite the great significance we attribute to a full accounting of the suffering and loss of victims, a relentless pursuit of recognition
may put in jeopardy other important goods-such as promoting peace, stability, or the rule of law. In other words, in certain situations, it may make
perfect sense not to pursue recognition fully to secure other competing values that, on occasion, are morally relevant. What may be needed, then, is a
compromise, but not of the "shabby" sort; rather of the sort that provides
some protection for the victimized against powerful conceptions of a general social benefit. If we value individuals and their individual experiences
of harm and injury, then governments should not be able to easily justify
obstructing or curtailing the pursuit of recognition on the basis of some
consequential concerns (including social stability and the prevention of
365
future injustices).
What follows identifies some moral values other than recognition that
should be taken into account when reckoning with past wrongs and offers
a rough account of how these values may run into conflict with the pro363. BalancingJustice, supra note 201 passim.
364. Id. at 325.
365. One may perhaps even go further and argue that recognition, as conceived of
here, enjoys two kinds of priority: first, the burden of justification lies with those who
would seek to abridge or forestall the pursuit of recognition and second, some threshold
of recognition is an indispensable condition for restoring a minimally decent order in
the aftermath of mass violence. This suggestion, of course, needs much more development; but the basic moral point here is that victims as victims-not their oppressors or
society-at-large-"have first claim upon the attention and the resources of succor." Nigel
Biggar, Making Peace or Doing Justice: Must We Choose?, in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING
PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 13 (Nigel Biggar ed., 2003).
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posed model of (victim-centered) recognition. Figuring out precisely what
values one should consider and how these values are interrelated would
require an in-depth analysis of the aims and objectives of transitional justice, a task this article cannot pursue. In light of these limitations, the
ensuing discussion can provide no more than a "road map," a general
framework for further exploration.
Giving recognition to the victims of collective evildoing may conflict
with the wider societal needs for formal justice and the rule of law. As
commonly understood, the requirement of "the rule of law calls for administration by a formal system itself committed to fairness and opportunities
for individuals to be heard both in accusation and in defense. '3 66 In other
words, it aims at resolving questions of guilt in a procedurally fair manner,
according to the "same rules and commands that govern all of us." 3 67 Con-

sequently, protections afforded to defendants against unfounded accusations-including the presumption of innocence and the rights to introduce
evidence, to be heard in public, to call and confront witnesses, to have
counsel of choice, and to be informed of the nature of the charge-have a
central place in the legal system. The overarching consideration here is the
integrity of the legal system as a matter for the broader society (as well as
for the defendant): reintroducing rule-bound, sober authority into a terrain
fraught with lawlessness and desires for revenge. However, formal justice
of this sort, cool and cognitive, may fail to properly recognize the injured
and their experience of uncomprehending suffering. Indeed, the almost
exclusive focus on perpetrators and legal standards governing the burden
of proof is very likely to miss the "micro-picture" of the victims and their
felt experience of injustice. All of these notions demonstrate the appropriateness of permitting, to some extent, victim-impact statements or other
measures aimed to grant victims a greater voice and make the process less
intimidating to them. Clearly, if we take the idea of principled compromises seriously, then the appropriate content and extent of such victimoriented reforms will crucially depend on how they can be reconciled with
principles of fairness, neutrality, and predictability.
As we have just seen, the rule of law ensures that those suspected of
crimes are treated fairly and thus guards against overly hasty findings or
assumptions of guilt. In that sense, the rule of law embodies recognition of
the equal dignity of all citizens. This, however, is not the end of the story
of the moral significance of recognition for potential perpetrators. In trying to discern a notion of recognition that is broader and more general
than simply the rule of law, it may be helpful to consider what Hegel criticizes as "abstract thinking": seeing "nothing in a murderer except the
abstract fact that he is a murderer, and to annul all other human essence in
him with this simple quality."'3 6 8 It is, indeed, tempting to regard the
agents of terrible deeds as purely and simply evil, morally "rotten," and
366. MINOW, supra note 1, at 25.

367. Id. at 26.
368.
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devoid of any capacity for positive change. Similarly, after episodes of
mass atrocity, there is a strong impulse to brand an entire nation or group
as totally savage, primitive, cruel, fanatical, incorrigibly evil, and so on.
Such abstract thinking, however, is not just shallow and superficial, it also
denies the very possibility of moral transformation. If we owe each other
respect and decent treatment, then this way of "writing off' human individuals or groups is unacceptable. 3 69 "Even the worst criminals," writes
Avishai Margalit, "are worthy of basic human respect because of the possibility that they may radically reevaluate their past lives and, if they are
given the opportunity, may live the rest of their lives in a worthy manner." 3 70 The challenge, then, is to recognize the perpetrator as an individual, a human being, in all his or her complexity-to particularize,
individualize, and indeed humanize, rather than generalizing and stere37 1
otyping, and ultimately dehumanizing.
A fuller discussion of the proposed model of recognition would also
consider its relationship to reconciliation. In political life, the word "reconciliation" is often used quite loosely and can give rise to various claims
regarding the meaning of that concept as well as the processes and conditions that may lead to its achievement. At its simplest, however, political
reconciliation refers to overcoming conflict and bringing former enemies
into a state of peace. 3 7 2 There is a sense, then, in which reconciliation can
conflict directly with the notion of recognizing victims of crime: where reconciliation entails a settlement of the past such that its effects will not
haunt the present and future, recognition involves making future claims
based on past wrongs. This would seem to suggest that too much or the
wrong kind of recognition might disturb or impede reconciliation. The
kind of recognition envisaged here, however, may blend into the notion of
political reconciliation. Very broadly, getting "over" the past may require
369. This argument parallels, and draws on, Trudy Govier's vivid and strong defense
of the possibility of moral transformation. See FORGIVENESS AND REVENGE, supra note
200, at 119-40.
370. MARGALIT, supra note 34, at 70.

371. See generally Halpern & Weinstein, supra note 126. In pursuing this line of
thought further, it may be useful to think of recognition as involving something like a
communicative process in which criminals are treated and addressed as responsible and
full, if imperfect, members of the political community-or, as R. A. Duff puts it, "as
citizens who are bound by the normative demands of the community's public values,
who must thus be called to account and censured for their breaches of those values, but
also as citizens whose ... autonomy, freedom, and privacy must be respected." DUFF,
supra note 183, at 113.
372. On this basic account, political reconciliation can mean a variety of things,
depending on how the term "peace" is defined and limited. If we favor a "thin" conception of reconciliation, it may mean no more than non-violent coexistence. But, to some,
this is asking for too little. In David Crocker's view, for instance, the core notion of
reconciliation is that of bringing former enemies "to hear each other out, to enter into a
give and take about matters of public policy, to build on areas of common interests, and
to forge principled compromises with which all can live." Crocker, supra note 309, at
54-55. Others, like Archbishop Desmond Tutu, paint a decidedly more ambitious picture, suggesting that efforts to achieve reconciliation should be about our highest aspirations for mutual healing, harmony, and positive fellow-feeling. See TUTU, supra note 12,
at 31-32.
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having one's experiences of injustice addressed and recognized. Although
a government may find it easy to simply ignore or dismiss such claims of
recognition, doing so appears at odds with a certain idea of reconciliation
as a process in which victims and transgressors can begin to trust and work
with another. Forgotten or ignored claims may be dormant, but "dormancy is not the same as reconciliation." 3 73 Consequently, an argument
could be made that meeting some minimal level of recognition-which may
involve a publicly verifiable account of what happened and who was
responsible-is a necessary condition for engaging in political
reconciliation.
Needless to say, all of these assumptions invite further clarification.
At this point, however, it is important to briefly turn to another concept,
that of political forgiveness, and explore the ways in which it may conflict
with, or conform to, the model of recognition offered here. In so doing, I
want to rely on the theoretic framework Peter Digeser develops in his
important book Political Forgiveness.374 Unlike interpersonal, sentimentbased versions of forgiveness, Digeser's account of forgiveness is tightly
connected to a vision of politics that focuses on individual or collective
actions, rather than on people's emotions or motivations. 3 75 As envisioned
here, political forgiveness is an illocutionary act-not an expression of feeling-that entails clearing a moral debt that is owed. In placing more
emphasis on the self-disclosure aspects of action than the presence or
removal of certain sentiments, this conception of forgiveness rests on premises similar to those at work in the formalistic, ritualistic vision of recognition defended throughout this article. Like Digeser, I believe that politics
should be more about appropriate political conduct than about appropriate
particular feelings; and like him, I tend to reject a sentiment-based politics-a particular form of politics as soul-craft or demanding certain feelings-as "deeply intrusive" and "potentially tyrannical. ' 376 This said,
difficulties arise when considering the relationship between political forgiveness and recognition. From a certain perspective, the choice between
forgiveness and recognition looks like a choice between irreconcilable values, an all-or-nothing affair: while recognition is something that is owed to
victims of crime, forgiveness releases what is owed. But this seems to overstate the conflict. As Digeser suggests, forgiving is not the same as forgetting; the former requires publicly "recalling and understanding the past,"
whereas the latter "lets go [of] the past with little attempt to understand
it." 37 7 Thus, according to Digeser, a shared and publicly verifiable account
of the wrong or debt (of who owes what to whom) is a necessary condition
DIGESER, supra note 275, at 73.
374. See id.
375. See id.
376. Id. at 18. This does not mean that legitimate feelings (of distress, discomfort,
etc.) produced by human action, or omission, should be excluded from moral consideration; rather it is quite the contrary. It does mean, however, that the deepest aspects of
people's attitudes and convictions-their "inner citadels of soul"-are not the proper
concern of an acceptably liberal state. DUFF, supra note 183, at 125 (quotingJ.R. Lucas).
377. DIGESER, supra note 275, at 56.
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for political forgiveness. 3 78 To be sure, arriving at this kind of understanding is also an essential component of the account of recognition here;
thinking of political forgiveness in these terms may, therefore, significantly
relax the tension between forgiveness and a politics of recognition.
This completes the discussion of the larger meaning and conceptual
underpinnings of the demands of recognition made by the victims of mass
atrocity. This article has argued that giving public recognition to the
injured and their sense of injustice should be one of the central concerns
of "transitional justice" as a kind of discourse that has introduced a novel
attitude into politics-an attitude that may serve as grounds for hope of
moral and political progress, however fragile, reversible, and vulnerable.
Though less exhilarating than Kant's promise of perpetual peace, 3 79 the
very idea of transitional justice rests on the recognition that human history
can be an occasion not only for despair and regression but also for hope
and reform; and that there is, after all, the possibility for human development in the direction of greater harmony and decency. It should be noted,
however, that nothing rules out, indeed much favors, the misuse of the concept in public policy. In the modern "age of terrorism," marked as it is by
the events of September 11 and their aftermath, the temptation of ruthlessness is overwhelming, and the language of (infinite?) justice-or recognition, for that matter-may easily serve as a cover for the expedient choice
of deliberate abuse or suspension of rights. But that is a different story.
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